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LIES, LINE DRAWING, AND (DEEP) FAKE NEWS
MARC JONATHAN BLITZ*
You’ve been bitten by someone’s false beliefs. Thought contagion.
—Muse, Thought Contagion (Warner Music single 2018)
Don’t trust a stranger’s words . . .
And they hypnotized all of us. Nobody knew who they could
really trust.
And they stretched us out until we split. Divided us up until there
just was nothing left.
—Chad VanGaalen, Host Body,
on LIGHT INFORMATION (Sub Pop Records 2017)
I. Introduction
Before the computer-generated virtual reality of the 1999 movie The
Matrix, there was The Cosmic Puppets—a 1957 book by Philip K. Dick in
which a man, after many years living elsewhere, drives back to his hometown
and discovers it is not merely the town that has changed, but its entire
history.1 The house he lived in and streets he walked upon growing up have
not merely been torn down and paved over—they’ve now never existed.2 The
protagonist discovers that he remains a part of the town’s history: an old
newspaper he obtains from the archives refers to his nine-year-old self in an
obituary describing his death from scarlet fever.3 Instead of leaving the town
at age nine, he has, in the town’s new strange and unfamiliar reality, been
dead since that time.4 He finally meets one other person in the town who
remembers it the way he does and has also been trying to understand why the
town’s appearance and history has been covered with a false surface.5 With
extraordinary mental effort, some homemade electrical technology, and
stubborn refusal to accept the views of their fellow town members, they are

* Alan Joseph Bennett Professor of Law, Oklahoma City University; J.D., University
of Chicago (2001); Ph.D., (Political Science) University of Chicago (2001), B.A., Harvard
University (1989).
1. PHILIP K. DICK, THE COSMIC PUPPETS (First Mariner Books 2012) (1957).
2. Id. at 1–6.
3. Id. at 12.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 54–55.
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able to slowly strip away the veneer of fake reality that has been laid over
their world and see once again the real town hidden underneath.6
Dick’s story is just one example of what is sometimes called “paranoid
science fiction,” a genre of science fiction where, as one encyclopedia of
science fiction and fantasy describes it, “protagonists are plagued with vague
intuitions of the stage-managed falsity of their perceptual experience or
delusory nature of their very identities.”7 One finds numerous other examples
of paranoid science fiction in Dick’s own writing, including other stories
where one’s environment turns out to be a carefully constructed simulation
and stories (like the basis for the movie Blade Runner) where the people one
knows might be androids virtually indistinguishable from real human beings.8
Other works of science fiction and fantasy also fit the genre: stories (and
movies) such as The Thing and Invasion of the Body Snatchers, where people
are replaced by alien look-a-likes;9 Twilight Zone episodes where a man finds
his life is a screenplay in which he is a television actor;10 and The Matrix
itself, where the day-to-day life the protagonists have grown up believing in
is revealed to take place in a virtual reality simulation.11 Indeed, some
examples of such paranoid science fiction are much older. One arguably finds
something like it in the philosopher Rene Descartes’ 1641 thought
experiment, wherein he imagines an omnipotent evil demon who can make
him see, hear, and feel an external reality—“the sky, the air, the earth,
colours, shapes, sounds and all external things”—of a kind that doesn’t really
exist.12
As the name indicates, paranoid science fiction is only fiction. In all of the
stories just referenced, the “stage-managed falsity” of “perceptual
6. Id. at 131–36.
7. Gary Westphal, Paranoia, in 2 THE GREENWOOD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SCIENCE FICTION
AND FANTASY 585 (Greenwood Press 2005).
8. See Blade Runner, INTERNET MOVIE DATABASE, https://www.imdb.com/title/tt00
83658/plotsummary (last visited July 5, 2018).
9. See The Thing, INTERNET MOVIE DATABASE, https://www.imdb.com/title/
tt0084787/plotsummary (last visited July 5, 2018); Invasion of the Body Snatchers,
INTERNET MOVIE DATABASE, https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0049366/plotsummary (last
visited July 5, 2018).
10. See The Twilight Zone: A World of Difference, INTERNET MOVIE DATABASE
https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0734552/?ref_=tt_urv (last visited July 5, 2018).
11. See The Matrix, INTERNET MOVIE DATABASE https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0133093/
plotsummary (last visited July 5, 2018).
12. RENE DESCARTES, MEDITATIONS ON FIRST PHILOSOPHY 15 (ed., trans. John
Cottingham Cambridge Univ. Press 1996).
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experience” is the product of a mythical, supernatural entity or forms of alien
or artificial intelligence imagined by the author. In other tales less removed
from historical experience, the falseness of our historical world is the product
not of an omnipotent demon or computer matrix, but rather of a controlhungry authoritarian system, like the Ministry of Truth used in Orwell’s 1984
to create “day-to-day falsification of the past” to ensure that people’s beliefs
about reality serve the government’s interest.13
But soon, at least a modest power of reality distortion may belong not
solely to evil demons, digital overlords, or ministries of propaganda, but
rather to any individual with widely available computer software: new
technologies for altering video and audio material will likely allow
individuals to create convincingly realistic footage of events that never
occurred. Indeed, “forensic specialists predict that computers will be able to
generate convincing, fabricated audio and video recordings at a rapid pace in
the next few years,” which, one commentator notes, “will take fake news to a
whole new level.”14 Another stresses that “[a]lready available tools for audio
and video manipulation . . . have begun to look like a potential fake news
Manhattan Project.”15 In a recent post on Lawfare Blog, Bobby Chesney and
Danielle Citron describe such technologically generated illusions as “deep
fakes”—a phrase that has been most often used to describe a genre of
artificial-intelligence-generated pornography that makes celebrities appear to
engage in sexual scenes they had nothing to do with.16 Chesney and Citron
describe the generation of deep fakes more broadly as “digital manipulation
of sound, images, or video to impersonate someone or make it appear that a
person did something—and to do so in a manner that is increasingly realistic,
to the point that the unaided observer cannot detect the fake.”17 They further
note that deep fakes are not likely to remain the province of governments or
extraordinarily powerful corporations, but will rather “diffuse rapidly and
13. GEORGE ORWELL, 1984, at 289 (Samaira Book Publishers 2017) (1949).
14. Hilke Schellmann, The Dangerous New Technology That Will Make Us Question
Our Basic Idea of Reality, QUARTZ (Dec. 5, 2017), https://qz.com/1145657/the-dangerousnew-technology-that-will-make-us-question-our-basic-idea-of-reality/.
15. Charlie Warzel, He Predicted the 2016 Fake News Crisis. Now He’s Worried About
an Information Apocalypse, BUZZFEED NEWS (Feb. 11, 2018), https://www.buzzfeed.com/
charliewarzel/the-terrifying-future-of-fake-newsfakenews?utm_term=.ofPnjaMqa#.ehdR6
MXYM.
16. Bobby Chesney & Danielle Citron, Deep Fakes: A Looming Crisis for National
Security, Democracy and Privacy?, LAWFARE (Feb. 21, 2018), https://www.lawfareblog.
com/deep-fakes-looming-crisis-national-security-democracy-and-privacy.
17. Id.
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globally” and “end up in the hands of a vast range of actors willing to use
deep fakes in harmful ways.”18
Given the havoc that would surely ensue if individuals engaged in a kind
of informational Hobbesian war of all against all—with people constantly
falsifying one another’s sense of what is real—it makes sense to ask whether
government has the power to take measures against this sort of action. It is,
after all, government that social contract theorists like Hobbes and Locke
looked to help individuals escape from the insecurity of a “state of nature”
where individuals were constantly vulnerable to physical attack from their
neighbors. Might government likewise protect people against informational
attack?
One potential barrier for government regulation of information attack, of
course, is the First Amendment. Deep fakes, for example, are generally video
or audio creations, and such creations have typically been considered a form
of expression. So too is a painting created in the style of Rembrandt, perhaps
so faithfully that even viewers educated in art history will mistake it for a
Rembrandt painting. Do these types of expression receive First Amendment
protection even when they are intended to deceive, and succeed in their
deception? If they are protected by free speech guarantees, then how is
government to protect people from the kind of havoc which writers predict
may arise from deep fakes? If, on the other hand, they are not protected, then
does this also open the door for government to restrict other kinds of
expression—beyond doctored video- or audiotapes—such as false evidence
of events that takes the form of words rather than video footage? If the First
Amendment does not present a barrier to regulating deep fakes, why then
would it present a barrier to government restriction of “fake news” that takes
the form of a false Tweet or Facebook post? Or a factual claim about public
affairs—falsely made by a skilled and persuasive speaker—to an audience
ready to believe it?
My purpose in this Essay is to use these questions as a starting point for
taking another look at a question that has been thoughtfully explored in recent
free speech jurisprudence and scholarship. Namely, when does factually false
expression qualify for First Amendment protection, and when it does not? In
the past two years, this question has been raised about fake news, a vague
phrase that refers to efforts to spread false information about public affairs or
publicly known individuals, principally over the Internet, by means as simple
as making the false claim in a Tweet, or as sophisticated as creating a fake
18. Id.
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but seemingly real imitation of a newspaper or other established media (and
perhaps fake photographic evidence to accompany it). This Essay does not
offer a definitive answer to the question of when the falsity in fake news
might fail to receive the First Amendment protection that normally applies to
expression of all kinds (including false and inaccurate information). Nor will
it offer a definitive answer to the question of whether and when deep fakes
might receive First Amendment protection when they deceive with video- or
audio-alteration rather than verbal expression.
Instead, this Essay aims to explore and reflect on the merits of some of the
key legal frameworks that judges and scholars have offered for addressing
such questions and to outline an additional proposal that is especially relevant
to the problem of fabricated video and audio. It begins in Part II by
introducing the key framework that the Supreme Court has offered for
thinking about such issues, particularly the discussion among the Justices in
United States v. Alvarez19 about when lying should count as protected free
speech. As explained below, the key lesson of Alvarez for the regulation of
fake news or politically relevant deep fakes is that, so long as their content is
a matter of public concern—as most news of any kind is—then it can be
proscribed by government only if it falls into a historically unprotected
category of expression such as fraud or defamation.
In Parts III and IV, I will explore some possible variations of this model—
each of which modestly expands the kind of false speech that government
may regulate. Part III examines three possible bases, discussed in other
scholars’ work, for how one might do so. Lies about politics, philosophy,
history, and other matters of public concern might be subject to restriction not
only when they cause “legally cognizable harm,” but also (i) when they are
exceptions to the general assumption that false claims about public events or
political subjects are, by their very nature, matters of public concern, or (ii)
when they do one or both of the following: (a) knowingly manipulate a
listener with false information to serve the speaker’s ends rather than his
own, or (b) provide the listener with unfounded expert knowledge or other
claims that an asymmetry in information makes the listener ill-equipped to
critically assess. Neither of these, I will argue, seems all that likely to make a
significant difference in how the Alvarez framework gets applied.
In Part IV, however, I will identify something that may do so, particularly
given recent technological developments. Fake news may lose protection, I
suggest, when it is not only a falsity, but a forgery as well. In other words, a
19. 567 U.S. 709 (2012).
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distinctive type of harm may arise when the falsehood is not merely in the
content of the speech that is intended to deceive, but is also in its purported
source or vehicle. This is not limited to situations where video or audio make
nonexistent events seem real. Imagine, for example, that a news story reaches
its audience and, in doing so, provides the audience with fake content while
masquerading as another publication. The story could, for example, come in
the guise of an article by the Washington Post or the Miami Herald, though
neither publication played any role in it. The falsity in such expression is not
only in a statement contained within the writing, but in way the writing is
disguised as an authoritative journalistic source.
II. Alvarez, “Low Value” Speech, and Lying
Before delving into the legal questions posed by so-called deep fakes—the
“potential fake news Manhattan Project” discussed above—it is useful to
briefly explore some more familiar examples of fake news that are a part of
the present, rather than a dystopian near-future. On September 30, 2016—just
over a month before the presidential election—the website for the Christian
Times Newspaper exposed a carefully hidden plan that that was supposed to
have remained a secret from voters: tens of thousands of fake ballots sat in an
Ohio warehouse, ready to be used on election day to swing the election
results in Ohio, overriding the voters’ wishes and assuring the election
outcome desired by the secretive operation that created the fake ballots.20
Accompanying the story was a photograph of the electrician who had
stumbled upon the scheme, standing behind the many ballot-filled boxes.21
Except, in the end, it was not these hidden ballots that were fraudulent, but
the news story that “revealed” them. As the New York Times reported four
months later, the Christian Times Newspaper was not a real newspaper.22 It
was a website created by a recent college graduate trying to make some
money off of fake news by putting concrete evidence behind the vague fear,
expressed by many Trump supporters at the time, that Hillary Clinton’s
campaign was preparing to steal the election.23 The photograph in the story
was real, but it had nothing to do with ballots in Ohio: “It was a photo from
20. Scott Shane, From Headline to Photograph: A Fake News Masterpiece, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 18, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/18/us/fake-news-hillary-clintoncameron-harris.html.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
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The Birmingham Mail, showing a British election 3,700 miles from
Columbus.”24 Nothing in the photo clearly revealed that or contradicted the
caption, which set it in the United States and characterized it as depicting the
Trump-Clinton contest.25
This was only one of a multitude of fake news stories that ran prior to the
2016 election. Enterprising young workers in Veles, Macedonia produced
hundreds of articles attempting to draw interest from politically obsessed
American internet users—along with the advertising revenue their “clicks”
would bring.26 One of these stories, for example, revealed that Hillary Clinton
had said in 2013 that people “Like Donald Trump” should “Run For Office”
because “They’re Honest And Can’t Be Bought.”27 As the indictment
obtained by Special Counsel Robert Mueller recently recounted, the Russian
Internet Research Agency likewise contributed to the confusion in election
reporting by borrowing real—and inventing fake—American identities, such
as a Twitter account purportedly run by the Tennessee GOP, to spread
misinformation.28
Nor is fake news the only fake information reporters have raised concerns
about. In 2013, a journalist for Science (trained as a biologist) revealed how
easy it had been for him to get fake science accepted for publication in over a
hundred open-access science journals, some run by well-known and
established publishing companies.29 He explained in his Science exposé that
he had written an analysis demonstrating “the anticancer properties of a
chemical . . . extracted from a lichen.”30 He then submitted a variation of this
made-up study to over 300 open-access journals (under a false name and
false institutional affiliation, with a made-up university) to see how many
would be duped by it.31 “More than half of the journals accepted the paper,”

24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Craig Silverman & Lawrence Alexander, How Teens in the Balkans Are Duping
Trump Supporters with Fake News, BUZZFEED NEWS (Nov. 3, 2016), https://www.
buzzfeed.com/craigsilverman/how-macedonia-became-a-global-hub-for-pro-trump-misinfo?
utm_term=.hq0x0L4lL#.ptd30r4Gr.
27. Id.
28. Indictment, United States v. Internet Research Agency, No. 1:18-cr-00032-DLF
(D.D.C. Feb. 16, 2018), 2018 WL 914777.
29. John Bohannon, Who’s Afraid of Peer Review?, 342 SCIENCE 60, 60–64 (2013),
http://science.sciencemag.org/content/342/6154/60.full.
30. Id.
31. Id.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2018

66

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71:59

he noted, “failing to notice its fatal flaws,” which included a graph that
showed results flatly at odds with those claimed by the paper itself.32
Does First Amendment doctrine allow, and should it allow, government to
punish such fake news, junk science, and other false statements of fact?
Where such falsity is used not to test journals’ quality control, as the Science
journalist did, but in order to deceive the public into accepting its truth,
should legislatures be able to subject the speaker to civil or criminal liability?
The most familiar answer in First Amendment caselaw is no. As explained
below, all of the Justices in Alvarez found that allowing the government to
punish lying on matters of public concern would require inviting it to monitor
and screen out elements of public discourse in a way that is at odds with First
Amendment principles. But it is useful to explore more carefully how most
First Amendment analyses reach this conclusion.
Intuitively, the First Amendment status of fake new or fake science might
well depend in part on what kind of fakery one believes is involved in fake
news or fake science. If it is like the kind of forgery or faking one finds in the
commercial sphere, then government probably has some room to regulate and
to restrict it. In the commercial marketplace, government often stands
ready to intervene in order to protect consumers from deception. For
instance, it protects us against being sold forgeries or other fake goods.
Prosecutors bring cases against those who peddle counterfeit
pharmaceuticals,33 travel scams,34 fake concert tickets,35 or other goods
that aren’t what they purport to be. And government may generally
intervene in this way even where the deception is carried out through, or
consists of, expression. The sale of an artistic forgery can be a crime,36 as
can sale of a fake celebrity autograph.37
32. Id.
33. See John Roth, Counterfeit Drugs: Prosecuting the Profiteers, Protecting the Public
Health, FDA VOICE (Jul. 15, 2013), https://blogs.fda.gov/fdavoice/index.php/2013/07/
counterfeit-drugs-prosecuting-the-profiteers-protecting-the-public-health/.
34. See 10 Accused of Scamming More than $1 Million in New York City Travel Agency
Scheme, ABC NEWS (Dec. 12, 2014), http://abc7ny.com/travel/10-accused-of-scammingmore-than-$1-million-in-nyc-travel-agency-scheme/434520/.
35. Victor Fiorillo, Feds Charge Philly Man in Fake Bruce Springsteen Tickets Scheme,
PHILADELPHIA (Dec. 19, 2016, 12:39 PM), https://www.phillymag.com/news/2016/12/19/
fake-bruce-springsteen-tickets/#lsoSymKGSHv6W0fX.99.
36. See Christine E. Weller, Lessons from Two Recent Art Forgery Cases, 3 STETSON J.
ADVOC. & L. 1 (2016) (discussing U.S. laws used to prosecute crimes related to art fraud).
37. John Meyers, Gov. Brown Signs Law That Cracks Down on Fake Celebrity
Autographs, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 9. 2016), http://www.latimes.com/politics/essential/la-pol-
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Such governmental restriction of deception is not limited to the
commercial context. It is often illegal to make false statements where
government needs honest answers to questions or needs to assure there is
no deception about who is authorized to take actions that only
government officials may permissibly take.38 State laws typically ban
people from impersonating police officers or other government officials,39
from email “spoofing”40 or other use of fake online identities to cause
harm to others,41 from creating or using fake IDs to enter airports or other
secure areas,42 and from lying to building or restaurant inspectors.43 By
doing so, government enables us to move through public life without the
kind of paralyzing paranoia that might be necessary where everyone and
everything around us might be a potentially harmful impostor.
Government is thus, in this sphere of our lives, very much expected to
actively identify and, in a sense, quarantine and neutralize, falsehoods.
Matters are very different, however, in the “marketplace of ideas.”
Here, individuals are largely on their own: government may not
constitutionally exile certain ideas from the free trade in ideas as it can
ban harmful goods or services from the realm of buying and selling. As
the Supreme Court declared in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., “Under the
First Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea. However
pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its correction not on the
sac-essential-politics-updates-gov-brown-signs-law-that-cracks-down-1473451218-html
story.html.
38. See Helen Klein Murillo, The Law of Lying: Perjury, False Statements, and
Obstruction, LAWFARE (Mar. 22, 2017, 9:30 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/law-lyingperjury-false-statements-and-obstruction.
39. See United States v. Chappell, 691 F.3d 388 (4th Cir. 2012) (finding the First
Amendment permitted “Virginia police impersonation statute, Virginia Code § 18.2–174,
[which] prohibits individuals from falsely assuming or pretending to be a law enforcement
officer”).
40. See L. Richard Fischer & Shannon K. Ryerson, New York Arrests Spammer for EMail Spoofing, PRIVACY & INFO. L. REP., May 2003, at 19.
41. See Victor Luckerson, Can You Go to Jail for Impersonating Someone Online?,
TIME (Jan. 22, 2013), http://business.time.com/2013/01/22/can-you-go-to-jail-forimpersonating-someone-online/.
42. See, e.g., Man Arrested with Fake ID at Sanford Airport, Authorities Say, WESH2
(May 26, 2016), http://www.wesh.com/article/man-arrested-with-fake-id-at-sanford-airportauthorities-say/4449756.
43. See Former Niagara Falls Man Sentenced for Making a False Statement, U.S.
DEP’T OF JUST. (Jan. 22, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/usao-wdny/pr/former-niagara-fallsman-sentenced-making-false-statement.
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conscience of judges and juries but on the competition of other ideas.”44
Thus, government cannot deal with a person’s claim of being “cheated”
into adopting the wrong spiritual commitment or political ideology in the
way it deals with a person’s claim that she was duped into buying a fake
concert ticket, a forged piece of art, or a car that lacks the features its
seller touted. She may deeply regret having lived for years with a
religious commitment she now regards as erroneous. She may likewise
deeply regret having furthered a political ideology and advocated for
policies she now regards as damaging. And she may bitterly resent what
she sees as the misleading words of a proselytizer or passionate advocate
who helped bring her to the religion or political camp she now firmly
rejects. But American democracy gives government neither the power to
investigate and shutter the church or the political group she regrets
joining, nor the power to prevent new members from entering.
Government’s role here is to stand back and let individuals judge for
themselves whether ideas are worthy of adherence. In the realm of ideas,
wrote Justice Jackson in 1945, “every person must be his own watchman
for truth, because the forefathers did not trust any government to separate
the true from the false for us.”45
Where then do we classify fake news or junk science, like the kind I
described earlier, in this dichotomy? Are false articles or bogus science
more like goods we purchase that aren’t what they purport to be, or are
they more like spiritual or political ideas, where it is up to us, not the
government, to decide which ideas we will treat as true? On the one hand,
fake news or science articles aren’t generally products we rely upon to
fulfill a specific, practical purpose. They are not like a set of tickets we
purchase to get entry to concert or sporting event, which will entirely fail
to serve their purpose if they are fake. They are rather more like the heap
of other potentially mistaken or unwise claims—about politics, religion,
and a host of other topics—that each of us has to sort through and
evaluate in order to figure out what to believe about the world and how to
build good lives in it. But on the other hand, false factual statements are
unlike religious ideas and political opinions in at least one respect: they
can be exposed as fake. In this respect, they are more like a forged work
of art that purports to be a fifteenth century Da Vinci painting but is
44. 418 U.S. 323, 339–40 (1974).
45. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 545 (1945) (Jackson, J., concurring) (citing W.
Va. State Bd. Of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943)).
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neither from that time period nor the creation of Da Vinci. The fake news
article above was not from a real newspaper, and the writer did not base it
on any evidence of real events. The fake science article described above
wasn’t based on actual results or genuine scientific analysis.
For the Justices in United States v. Alvarez, the likely answer is that
absent legally cognizable harm, fake news and fake science fall squarely
in the same category as protected speech. Like religious ideas and
political opinions, they are staunchly protected against government
censorship. It might seem odd to describe that 2012 case as offering a
single answer of any kind to this question. The Court split three ways,
with no majority opinion. The specific question that the Justices confronted
was whether Congress could constitutionally subject a person, like Xavier
Alvarez, to criminal liability for doing what Alvarez had done—namely, to
falsely claim that he had received a Congressional Medal of Honor for
battlefield heroism that he had never shown on a battlefield where he had
never fought.46 Both Justice Kennedy’s plurality opinion and Justice Breyer’s
concurrence agreed that false statements are protected speech.47 They also
agreed that, in this case, the First Amendment barred Congress from
criminalizing Alvarez’s speech when it had other ways of combatting the
effects of his falsehoods—by, for example, creating a public website with an
authorized list of Medal of Honor winners that could show that Alvarez was
not among them.48 But they disagreed on how much protection the First
Amendment provides to false statements of fact, with Justice Kennedy
insisting that, absent a showing of legally cognizable harm, false statements
are just as protected as any other speech49 and Justice Breyer arguing
government should generally have more leeway to regulate verifiably false
statements than it has to restrict other speech content.50
Justice Alito’s dissenting opinion, by contrast, would have upheld
Congress’s statutory measure to combat an “epidemic of false claims about
military decorations,” and would have found that the government acted
constitutionally when it punished Alvarez for contributing his own false
claim to this epidemic.51 More generally, he argued, “false factual statements
possess no intrinsic First Amendment value,” and should receive no First
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Id. at 713.
Id. at 724 (plurality opinion); id. at 730–31 (Breyer, J., concurring).
Id. at 729.
Id. at 719 (plurality opinion).
Id. at 730–31 (Breyer, J., concurring).
Id. at 739 (Alito, J., dissenting).
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Amendment protection except where such protection is necessary to provide
sufficient breathing space for true statements on related subjects.52
Yet however much the Justices may have disagreed about the First
Amendment status of Alvarez’s false claims and similar autobiographical
lies, there was much they did agree upon—and this agreement reflected
aspects of First Amendment doctrine with a decades-long history. They
agreed, first of all, that some types of false speech—like false speech on
“philosophy, religion, history, the social sciences, the arts, and other matters
of public concern”—receive the same robust protection that political or
artistic expression or expression about the humanities and social sciences
receives in other contexts.53 Despite the falsity of these contributions to
public discourse, they are still contributions to public discourse and, as such,
an integral part of the democratic deliberation that the First Amendment
strongly insulates from government management. This provides us with an
important starting point for analyzing the First Amendment status of fake
news and fake science. Both these types of falsity seem to deserve a place on
this list. The above-cited fake news article about the 2016 presidential
election and the integrity of Ohio ballots was unquestionably about a matter
of public concern. It was an instance of the kind of political speech that the
Court has often said is at the core of the First Amendment. Scientific debates
likewise seem to be the kind of debates that even the Alvarez dissent would
place off limits to government control.
There is, however, a second point of agreement among the Justices, and it
might allow for government regulation of fake news or similar false
statements in at least some circumstances: false speech that causes certain
legally cognizable harms can be punished or subjected to civil liability
without raising significant First Amendment concerns.54 Government may
punish or subject to liability the harm that defamation causes to reputation,
that fraud causes to one’s property rights, or that perjury causes to judicial
truth-finding.55 Even where a lie concerns a political topic, this doesn’t mean
it can never count as defamation, fraud, or perjury. A person can commit
perjury by lying to hide an election law violation.56 A newspaper reporter can

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
Dakota

Id. at 746.
Id. at 751; see also id. at 731 (Breyer, J., concurring).
Id. at 718 (plurality opinion).
Id. at 718–22.
See Associated Press, Former GOP Senate Candidate Convicted of Violating South
Election Law, FOX NEWS: POL. (May 28, 2015), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/
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defame a public official by making knowingly or recklessly false claims
about that official’s alleged failures or wrongs.57 If the author of a real
newspaper article can defame the person it reports on, this can also, of course,
be true of the kind of fake news article that is often constructed around an
intentional lie. Consequently, if the political, historical, or scientific focus of
a false account places that account safely inside the scope of the First
Amendment, a legally cognizable harm caused by that account can push it
out.58
In short, the Justices in Alvarez agreed that government could generally
restrict certain harmful false statements, such as those involving fraud,
without raising First Amendment concerns.59 By contrast, they also
agreed that where false statements arise in public debate and concern
matters where disagreement is an inevitable and desirable part of that
debate—matters such as philosophy, history, social science, and art—
then the speaker of that falsity should be just as protected as she is when
she speaks a truth.60
This two-part consensus about free speech and falsity had roots not
only in prior cases, but also in familiar understandings about where
government can and cannot freely regulate the claims we make about our
activities. I noted above that government frequently prosecutes those who
sell fake or counterfeit goods or make material misrepresentations to
consumers. This would be impossible unless the First Amendment left
government free to punish lies that caused legally cognizable harms. As
Justice Kennedy wrote in Alvarez, “[w]here false claims are made to
effect a fraud or secure moneys or other valuable considerations, say
offers of employment, it is well established that the Government may
restrict speech without affronting the First Amendment.”61 By contrast,
where false speech is an inextricable part of the debates and deliberations
we engage in to think through our political commitments, policy choices,

2015/05/28/former-gop-senate-candidate-convicted-violating-south-dakota-election-law.
html (detailing Annette Bosworth’s conviction for violation of election law).
57. See, e.g., Ball v. E.W. Scripps, Co., 801 S.W.2d 684, 689 (Ky. 1990) (upholding
jury’s finding of actual malice in newspaper’s reporting about County Prosecutor).
58. United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 719 (2012) (plurality opinion).
59. Id. at 729.
60. Id. at 751 (Alito, J., dissenting); see also id. at 731 (Breyer, J., concurring).
61. Id. at 723 (citing Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425
U.S. 748, 771 (1976)).
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or religious preferences, it is in a realm which government generally has
no legitimate claim to manage.62
This contrast—between a government’s duty to actively patrol
falsehoods in the realm of commerce and security and its obligation to
refrain from doing so in the realm of ideas—has deeper roots in liberal
political theory. A century before the Constitution’s enactment, John
Locke wrote in A Letter Concerning Toleration that government is not
only authorized, but also duty bound to protect “life, liberty, health, and
indolence of body, and the possession of outward things such as money,
lands, houses, furniture, and the like.”63 Protecting our physical security
and property, he argued, is the reason to submit to government in the first
place. The “part of the magistrate,” he argued, “is . . . to take care that the
commonwealth receive no prejudice, and that there be no injury done to
any man, either in life or estate.”64 So government must be given room to
perform this role; it has to be able to protect against harm to our persons
and property, including harm of the sort that occurs, in part, through
deception.
What government was not free to do, under Locke’s framework, was to
claim authority over the “care of the soul,” or the inward realm of
conscience.65 Government’s role is not, for instance, to tell us what
religious doctrine is deserving of our adherence. And even where
opinions are clearly “false and absurd,” government’s role, insisted
Locke, “is not to provide for the truth of opinions.”66 Instead, it is to
assure “safety and security of the commonwealth.”67 For Locke, as for
American jurists who followed, it was for the individual, not the
government, to decide what is true in the realm of conscience.68 Locke
was primarily interested in keeping government from interfering in our
religious lives, but modern-day judges are just as emphatic that
government avoid interfering in our formation of political and other
opinions. As Justice Jackson emphasized in Thomas v. Collins, it is not
62. See, e.g., James Weinstein, Free Speech and Domain Allocation: A Suggested
Framework for Analyzing the Constitutionality of Prohibitions of Lies in Political
Campaigns, 71 OKLA. L. REV 167, 206–13 (2018).
63. JOHN LOCKE, A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION 10 (Hudderfeld 1796) (1689).
64. Id. at 40.
65. Id. at 27.
66. Id. at 48.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 33 (stating that “men cannot be forced to be saved” and that “when all is done,
they must be left to their own consciences”).
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only in the realm of religion where government is barred from
authoritatively distinguishing true and false doctrine.69 Rather,
government is barred more generally from “assuming a guardianship of
the public mind.”70 It is barred from telling people what may and may not
be a legitimate component of public discourse.
It is thus not surprising that, as the Court of the late twentieth century
shaped First Amendment free speech law into a more libertarian,
government-limiting doctrine than it had once been, it roughly followed
this Lockean template. Indeed, the Court generally divided activity
between a realm of physical and financial interactions, where government
has a crucial role in securing safety and property, and a realm of ideas,
where government must generally let individuals shape their own thought
free from government interference.
As I have emphasized before, this Lockean model of government gives
us one way to help make sense of why the Court has identified certain
exceptions to what is, in current First Amendment doctrine, a “bedrock
principle” that speech may not be restricted by government on the basis
of the ideas it communicates:71 while government may not generally
target certain speech content for restriction, it may do so when the content
falls into a particular category the court has recognized as unprotected by
free speech law or (in the case of commercial speech) less protected than
other kinds of expression.72
The First Amendment, for example, does not place any high judicial
hurdles in government’s way when the speech it wishes to restrict
consists of “true threats” that communicate a serious intent to commit
unlawful violence,73 defamation,74 commercial speech,75 or certain other
69. 323 U.S. 516, 545 (1945) (Jackson, J., concurring).
70. Id.
71. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414, (1989) (“If there is a bedrock principle
underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression
of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.”); see also
Ashcroft v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 535 U.S. 564, 573 (2002) (“As a general matter, . . .
government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject
matter, or its content.”).
72. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992).
73. See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003).
74. See R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 399, 406.
75. Id. at 383–86; Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978) (stating
that the Supreme Court has afforded “commercial speech a limited measure of protection,
commensurate with its subordinate position in the scale of First Amendment values”).

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2018

74

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71:59

kinds of content. In at least some cases, the Court has suggested that the
reason the First Amendment allows government to regulate such speech
is that such speech is not only expressing ideas, but also has powerful
effects on the realm of activity where government is duty bound to
protect personal security and property. For example, true threats are
inextricably linked to potential violence,76 and commercial speech is
“inextricably intertwined” with buying, selling, and the possible fraud
that can accompany it.77 These realms of speech, in other words, do not
merely involve exchange of thought. Instead, they frequently have
powerful and predictable effects in the realm of security and property that
most liberal theorists since Locke have identified as the natural realm for
vigorous government oversight and action.
This is not to say that First Amendment doctrine’s definition of
unprotected speech categories maps perfectly onto the Lockean
distinction between the outward realm of the state and individuals’
autonomy in matters of religion or other opinion. First, some categories of
unprotected speech do not clearly implicate the state’s duty to protect
personal security and property. Unlike commercial speech regulations
that protect individuals from deceptive or coercive commercial actors, or
proscriptions of true threats that protect physical security, obscenity
regulations seem to protect readers’ mental welfare and culture (unless,
perhaps, one can justify them as needed to combat certain physical harms
that can arise from obscene speech). And certain speech torts may raise
similar problems. First Amendment law allows states to impose liability
for invasion of privacy, and it may not be clear why the state’s duties to
protect security and property give it any more power to restrict privacydamaging speech (such as that in “public disclosure of private facts”) than
any other kind of speech.
Second, it is not only unprotected speech that can have powerful
effects on security and property. Speech protected by current First
Amendment doctrine often concerns those interests as well. It is not only
commercial speech that may strongly impact our financial condition, but
also the staunchly protected expression individuals exercise when they
exhort policymakers or their fellow citizens to adopt economic policies
that are protectionist, socialist, or libertarian in character, or when they
argue for one understanding of Fifth Amendment takings jurisprudence
76. See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359–60 (2003).
77. Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 767 (1993).
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rather than another. Speech in the political realm, after all, is not generally
designed only for the purpose of providing material for abstract debates;
it is meant to persuade people to take certain actions, to make a concrete
difference in the world.
Still, it is at least plausible for courts and legal theorists to explain why
most unprotected categories of speech content are unprotected by first
emphasizing the effects they have on our physical security or financial
condition. Unlike proposals for a certain economic policy, threats of
violence are not meant as a contribution to deliberations in which a
listener can consider and then accept or reject them. Nor, one might
argue, are offers of sale or purchase, which are offered not as ideas to be
critically assessed but as appeals to a listener to take some economic
action in the near future. There may well be some arbitrariness and
artificiality in trying to classify speech as falling on one side or the other
of Locke’s line between the realm of outward things—those that affect
our physical security and property, for example—and the realm of inward
deliberation, opinion formation, and conscience.78 But one might argue
that, under our First Amendment jurisprudence, which embraces at least
some expressive or informational libertarianism, courts have to insulate
some deliberative spaces from state control. It requires them to at least
attempt to make some distinction between the words or arts that lie
squarely in the realm of expression and belief and the words or arts that
are a commercial product (like a forged artwork sold on the marketplace)
or serve as an instrument of financial harm or potential violence. Some
such distinction seems necessary if courts are to draw a line between
realms where government can actively regulate false speech that could
defraud us or damage our health, and those where the First Amendment
bars government from identifying and restricting allegedly inaccurate
claims about religion or politics.
It may also be the case that categories of unprotected or less-protected
speech are left more vulnerable to government regulation by existing free
speech doctrine not only because of what such speech does, but also
because of what it does not do. Commentators sometimes refer to these
categories of speech as “low-value” speech on the theory that they are
less likely than political speech, artistic expression, or other robustly

78. See Steven J. Heyman, Spheres of Autonomy: Reforming the Content Neutral
Doctrine in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 10 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 647, 657 (2002).
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protected expression to advance the core values of the First Amendment,
such as promoting self-governance or enhancing individual autonomy.79
The Court first suggested that certain types of speech content are
undeserving of full First Amendment protection in 1942. In Chaplinsky v.
New Hampshire, the Court held that free speech law does not protect use
of “fighting words—those which by their very utterance inflict injury or
tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.”80 The Court might have
justified this conclusion by simply explaining that fighting words are
inextricably linked to violent activity the state has a duty to prevent or
stop (like the true threats it later made clear also lack First Amendment
protection81). But it instead placed greater emphasis not on the harms that
fighting words cause, but rather on value they fail to deliver. Unlike other
expression, said the Court, fighting words form “no essential part of any
exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth
that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by
the social interest in order and morality.”82
It is not clear, however, that the Court still adheres to this view that
unprotected categories of speech are unprotected because they lack the
First Amendment value one typically finds in expression. In R.A.V. v.
City of St. Paul, the Court seemed to forcefully limit the view that
fighting words could never form an “essential part of any exposition of
ideas,” or that their value is in all respects “worthless.”83 On the contrary,
Justice Scalia explained, fighting words may well include a message—
and while the violence-generating potential of fighting words is not
protected, the message is.84 The Court here analogized government’s
restriction of low-value speech to government’s regulation of expressive
conduct or of the non-speech effects of protest activity: when government
restricts protesters’ burning of draft cards85 or blocking of streets,86 it is
79. See Genevieve Lakier, The Invention of Low-Value Speech, 128 HARVARD L. REV
2166, 2221 (2015).
80. 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
81. See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003).
82. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572.
83. 505 U.S. 377, 385 (1992) (citing Chaplinksy, 315 U.S. at 572).
84. Id. at 386–87.
85. United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 369, 370, 376–77 (1968).
86. Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 768–770 (1994) (upholding
constitutionality of a thirty-six foot buffer zone near an abortion clinic entrance and noting
the state’s “strong interest in ensuring the public safety and order, in promoting the free flow
of traffic on public streets and sidewalks, and in protecting the property rights of all its
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allowed to counter the physical threat or disruption raised by the burning
or blocking. But it is not allowed by First Amendment law to use its
property- and safety-protecting power as a pretext for silencing antigovernment messages.87 In the same way, Justice Scalia noted in R.A.V.,
government can protect us from the violence threatened by fighting words
(or true threats), but not as a pretext for crushing the messages that
accompany such intimidation or triggers of violence.88 This holding
appears to assume that fighting words, true threats, and other historically
unprotected content can serve as vehicles for communicating ideas89 and
are thus fair game for government regulation not because they lack such
ideas, but because—and only to the extent that—they communicate them
in a way that threatens harms that government must have power to
regulate in order to fulfill the duties it owes to the public.90
In any event, the above analysis suggests that there are at least two
reasons that certain kinds of speech content either fall outside of the First
Amendment’s scope or receive weaker shielding from it. Each of these
may help explain why some kinds of lies or other false statements are
unprotected. One reason is that while ideas are normally insulated from
government control, the expression of ideas can take a form that causes or
threatens harm to person or property. This can happen not only when the
physical manner of the expression creates a risk of such harm (through
non-speech conduct, like burning a flag or occupying space in a way that,
for example, affects traffic safety), but also because certain kinds of
words or speech content can itself cause risks by, for example, conveying
a threat of violence or perpetuating commercial fraud. To the extent a lie
or other falsity is, in part, the source of such a harm, it may well be
outside of the First Amendment.
This helps explain the first of the two points of consensus previously
identified in United States v. Alvarez: that certain kinds of false
statements—like defamation, fraud, or perjury—lie outside the First
Amendment because of the harm they work. This is not to say that the
Court stands ready to deny First Amendment protection to a category of
speech any time that it can be linked to physical or property-related harm.
citizens”) (citing Operation Rescue v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 626 So. 2d 664, 672 (Fla.
1993)).
87. Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 46 (1987).
88. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 385–86.
89. Id.
90. Id.
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On the contrary, it has expressly refused to use such a rationale to create
new exceptions to First Amendment protection, stating in United States v.
Stevens that courts did not have “freewheeling authority to declare new
categories of speech outside the scope of the First Amendment.”91 Still,
the fact that historically unprotected categories of speech tend to produce
harm of a kind government has long been duty bound to protect against
helps to explain why they have been historically unprotected, and perhaps
to better define the boundaries of categories such as true threats or
commercial speech.92
Second, a type of speech might be unprotected by the First
Amendment when it lacks the value that justifies First Amendment
protection, providing another potential basis for denying free speech
protection to some kinds of lies. Lies might fall outside the First
Amendment’s coverage if and when they are devoid of the kind of value
that justifies free speech protection, or where their restriction poses no
threat to such values. If, as some scholars suggest, the First Amendment
exists to promote an individual’s autonomy93 or provide a foundation for
democratic deliberation and collective self-government,94 there is a case
to be made that most factual falsehoods fail to further such purposes—
and are more likely to undermine them. This helps explain why the
concurrence and dissent in Alvarez are more comfortable with giving
government more leeway to restrict lies on matters other than
“philosophy, religion, history, the social sciences, the arts, and other
matters of public concern.”95 Lies that arise in discussion of the latter
topics are more likely to have First Amendment value themselves (or be
inextricably intertwined with robust debate that does) than are lies
unconnected to discussions which illuminate scientific or philosophical
questions or forge policy in democratic discourse.
91. United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 472 (2010). Courts may, however, recognize
categories that have “been historically unprotected, but have not yet been specifically
identified or discussed as such in our case law.” Id.
92. Id. at 470.
93. See, e.g., C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 50 (1989);
Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 620 (1982).
94. See Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT.
REV. 245, 255; see also James Weinstein, Participatory Democracy as the Central Value of
American Free Speech Doctrine, 97 VA. L. REV. 491, 513 (2011); Robert Post, Participatory
Democracy and Free Speech, 97 VA. L. REV. 477, 482 (2011).
95. United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 751 (2012) (Alito, J., dissenting); see also
id. at 731 (Breyer, J., concurring).
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These two rationales for denying First Amendment protection to
certain kinds of speech, including certain kinds of false statements, are
not mutually exclusive. One might argue that there are times they
essentially merge into one another: the harm generated by an unprotected
category of speech may itself consist of the fact that it undermines a
certain free-speech value where we rely on constitutional protections to
further it. Thus, Steven Heyman and Christina Wells have each offered
distinctive arguments that many low-value categories of speech are low
value because they undermine the capacities for individual autonomy that
free speech rights are supposed to protect and enhance.96 But it is helpful
to recognize that excluding certain speech from the First Amendment’s
scope on the basis of the nature of the harm it causes is conceptually
distinct from doing so on the basis that it lacks First Amendment value.
These two possible bases for treating certain speech as unprotected
sometimes operate separately. As noted earlier, the Court in R.A.V. v. City
of St. Paul seemed to argue that fighting words can be proscribed because
of the harm they cause—not because they lack expressive value, but in
spite of that value. And unlike the dissent in Alvarez, which argues that
lies about one’s personal life can typically be regulated (at least in part)
because they “possess no intrinsic First Amendment value,”97 the
plurality opinion finds factual falsity no less valuable or less worthy of
First Amendment protection than arguments that are “unreasoned” or
“uninformed,” and excludes such lies from the scope of free speech only
when they generate “legally cognizable harm.”98
The consequence, in any case, is that whatever rationale is adopted for
identifying unprotected or less-protected speech categories and explaining
why they are outside, or at the outer edges of, the First Amendment, the
Justices in Alvarez all appeared to agree at least that the realm of false
statements fits with this double level of more and less protected speech.
Lies that have consequences for financial wellbeing, physical safety, or
the wielding of government’s coercive force (as the result of a trial, for
example) can be targeted or penalized by government. This is true, at the
very least because of the harm they raise, and also, perhaps, because they
lack the value that inheres in mistaken or misleading political,
96. See Heyman, supra note 78; Christina E. Wells, Reinvigorating Autonomy: Freedom
and Responsibility in the Supreme Court’s First Amendment Jurisprudence, 32 HARV. C.R.C.L. L. REV. 159, 188–95 (1997).
97. Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 746 (Alito, J., dissenting).
98. Id. at 719 (plurality opinion).
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philosophical, or historical claims. Other false statements occur in the
realm of vigorous religious, political, or other public debates largely
insulated from government control. They may lead us to adopt spiritual,
philosophical, or political commitments we come to regret—but these are
not the kind of harms government has any role in correcting. And they
occur in debates and intellectual explorations whose value would be very
much at risk if government were allowed to interfere.
The focus of the disagreement between the Justices in Alvarez was in
how to assess both the risk of harm and the value at stake in false
speech—like Xavier Alvarez’s false claim to have won a Medal of
Honor—that, at first glance at least, fits into neither of the above two
categories. Alvarez’s claim was not a claim about philosophy, politics,
religion, science, or some other discipline for how individuals should
understand their place in the world. Neither was it a claim regarding how
Americans should understand their country and the policies that would
best serve it. It was simply an assertion that Alvarez had earned a badge
of heroism he hadn’t earned.99 Thus, it didn’t automatically receive the
robust First Amendment protection that all Justices would offer to claims
made about matters of public concern or other areas of knowledge where
there is robust disagreement and debate.
Nor did Alvarez’s boast cause a kind of harm that had traditionally
subjected speech to common law liability or criminal punishment.
Alvarez didn’t perjure himself, make a defamatory claim about someone
else, defraud others, or otherwise cause a recognized form of legally
cognizable harm. So his fabrication wasn’t automatically excluded from
the First Amendment scope as all of these false statements are.
For Justice Kennedy and the plurality, this lack of legally cognizable
harm was decisive—if Alvarez’s lie wasn’t the type that is excluded from
free speech coverage, then Alvarez must still be inside of (and shielded
by) First Amendment’s protection for expressive freedom.100 For Justice
Alito and the dissent, by contrast, the lack of First Amendment value in
Alvarez’s mundane lie about a fact concerning his own past was decisive
in a different way. Utter falsity, in the dissenters’ opinion, has no value,
and where government restriction of it raises no risk for free and vigorous

99.It is still possible to claim that such a false claim about one’s own history might be a
statement about a matter of “public concern” and I consider why this might be the case
below. See infra notes 126–130 and accompanying text.
100. Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 719.
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public debate, there is no reason for the First Amendment to prevent such
restriction.101
For the concurrence, by contrast, the challenge presented by
government measures against personal lies was a more complicated one.
Instead of finding that personal lies were maximally protected (except
where they caused legally cognizable harm) or entirely unprotected
(except where they were interwoven with political debate), the
concurrence found such lies existed in a challenging First Amendment
middle ground. In this middle ground, judges could not know if
government restriction was permissible or impermissible under the First
Amendment until they took a closer, context-sensitive look at the both the
potential harms raised by the falsity in question and the First Amendment
benefits that might be lost by letting government attack it.102
In any case, government restriction of fake news is unlikely to
occasion similar disagreement. The kinds of reports that typically get
labelled as fake news tend to focus on the very subjects that all the
Justices found to be strongly protected by the First Amendment: they tend
to concern political life, historical events, or findings generated by
science.
One might wonder why the Justices in Alvarez should grant the same
First Amendment protection to verifiably false statements concerning
philosophy, history, science, or similar topics as is given to claims that are
true, might be true, or are opinions (that thus cannot be classified as true or
false). Consider a public debate about the wisdom of the continuing U.S.
presence in Afghanistan to combat the Taliban and those they support in the
Al Qaeda. It is probably clear to most Americans why the First Amendment
staunchly protects a person’s right to call for withdrawing all American
troops from Afghanistan or to state, more generally, that our presence in
Afghanistan “accomplished nothing of value,” even if government officials
and many members of the public believe such a statement is entirely wrong
and that, for example, important counterterrorism objectives require a
continued U.S. military presence there. But why, one might wonder, should
First Amendment protection also extend to false factual claims that a person
makes about American operations or what led to them? Why, for example,
would the First Amendment protect a person in giving a false account of an
alleged high-casualty American operation that never took place? Or in falsely
101. Id. at 739, 746 (Alito, J., dissenting).
102. Id. at 730–31 (Breyer, J., concurring).
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insisting that the terrorist attacks Al Qaeda conducted on September 11,
2001, and commanded while being sheltered by the Taliban, actually had
nothing to do with Al Qaeda and were ordered by the Bush administration
itself?
Other scholars have provided cogent explanations as to why such false
statements of fact might receive First Amendment protection, some of which
have been endorsed by the Supreme Court in past First Amendment cases.103
In a careful and systematic analysis of this question, Helen Norton identifies
three principal reasons that government measures taken to restrict lies, or
possibly other false statements of fact, may violate the First Amendment. One
is that some lies have value. Lies can protect privacy; they can “trigger
confrontation and rebuttal” and by doing so “lead to increased public
awareness and understanding of the truth.”104 In other cases, lies may be an
essential part of strategies for uncovering the truth. Investigative journalists
and police informants, for instance, might lie about their identities and
motivations because wrongdoers would be unlikely reveal the harms they
inflict on the public to people they knew to be serving the public interest.
This is one of the reasons that Justice Breyer, in his Alvarez concurrence,
finds that lies and other false statements sometimes receive First Amendment
protection.105
A second reason for First Amendment protection of false facts, notes
Norton, is not that lies have intrinsic value but rather that, in a world where
false speech could be subjected to harsh punishment, individuals may avoid
even true or otherwise valuable speech out of fear that they it might include
falsity.106 As the Supreme Court noted in New York Times v. Sullivan, not
only might the fear of slipping into falsity chill other speech; the fear of being
accused of falsity (and having to defend against it in court) even when one
hasn’t said or written anything false may achieve the same end.107 Moreover,
it is at times unclear whether a statement constitutes an opinion or idea or
instead constitutes a fact. In Gertz, the Court stated “there is no such thing as
103. See, e.g., Alan K. Chen & Justin Marceau, High Value Lies, Ugly Truths, and the
First Amendment, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1435 (2015); Helen Norton, Lies and the Constitution,
2012 SUP. CT. REV. 161, 200; Frederick Schauer, Facts and the First Amendment, 57 UCLA
L REV 897 (2010); Jonathan D. Varat, Deception and the First Amendment: A Central,
Complex, and Somewhat Curious Relationship, 53 UCLA L REV 1107 (2006).
104. Norton, supra note 103, at 165–66.
105. Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 733 (Breyer, J., concurring).
106. Norton, supra note 103, at 169–79.
107. 376 U.S. 254, 270, 300 (1964).
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a false idea” (or opinion, for which it used idea as a synonym).108 But there
can be, it said, a “false statement[] of fact.”109 One might thus propose a First
Amendment regime that bars government from punishing opinions it
identifies as unworthy but allows it to punish facts it can demonstrate to be
false in a way that would presumably count as objective. It may not be clear,
however, when a statement can be demonstrated to be false in this way.
For example, the claim that “serious crime is rising in major American
cities,” may be regarded as factually false if it is taken to mean—as many
listeners would understand it—that the number of recorded murders and other
violent crimes is higher this month or year than in previous time frames. In
that case, one could presumably compare the statement to a trustworthy
analysis of some trustworthy source of data. But the statement could also be
understood as a vague claim about certain unspecified “serious” crimes
becoming more of a problem in unspecified “American cities” (and “rising”
could refer not to numbers but to increased effects, or fear of, crime). Other
claims that make a statement, but leave out context, may mislead some
audiences even though the speaker may assume that a critical listener should
be aware that statements cannot always include context. The consequence of
this blurriness in the boundary between a verifiably false fact and an
unverifiable expression of one’s belief or perception about the world is that
individuals may end up on the wrong side of this poorly marked line. And, as
a consequence of crossing such a boundary, an individual might lose First
Amendment protection for their speech, or at least create a situation where an
opponent can bring a suit (or a prosecutor to bring charges) by presenting a
claim as a false factual statement even where it may not actually be. A First
Amendment guarantee against such legal trouble or punishment gives people
freedom to engage in robust debate without worrying that they will be sued or
penalized for it.
Third and finally, Norton writes, the First Amendment may bar
government from targeting lies in public discourse, not in order to protect the
lying, but in order to stave off the detrimental consequences of letting
government exercise coercive authority over the exchange of ideas.110 It was
this last reason for protecting falsity that won the explicit support of all of the
Justices in Alvarez. As Justice Kennedy emphasized, having a government
truth commission to identify and punish such falsities would be reminiscent
108. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339–40 (1974).
109. Id. at 340.
110. Norton, supra note 103, at 170–72.
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of the Orwellian “Oceania’s Ministry of Truth.”111 Justice Alito’s dissent
likewise emphasized that, in debates about matters of public concern, “it is
perilous to permit the state to be the arbiter of truth,” even where the
arbitrating is limited to identifying flagrantly false statements about history,
philosophy, or other topics.112 Inviting the government to exercise control
over public debate is to invite it to wield coercive power in a realm where the
public must be as free as possible to form its own opinions and consider all
proposals (even those the vast majority of the public regards as preposterous),
where individuals must be left free to shape their own ideas, and where
society must be left free to forge its own collective preferences.
Jonathan Varat similarly explains that government cannot be given
anything close to a blank check to regulate false or misleading information
because public discourse and private deliberations alike are full of such
information.113 To give government free reign—or anything resembling it—
to restrict falsity would thus effectively give government free reign to restrict
much of our communication. Giving government unlimited power to drain
our conversations of deceptive content would give it power undermine “our
rights to personal and political self-rule.”114
In public debate or personal conversations about a person’s values or
understanding of the world, the remedy for falsehood thus comes not
from government, in these Justices’ view, but from the critical faculties of
the discussion’s participants and other sources they can recruit to evaluate
the veracity and quality of claims addressed to them. As Justice Kennedy
declared in his Alvarez opinion, “[T]he remedy for speech that is false is
speech that is true.”115 The First Amendment’s solution to the challenges
raised by non-factual or controversial claims is also its solution for
verifiably false claims. Just as the permissible First Amendment response
to unreasoned speech is not government suppression but rather rational
speech, so the permissible response to a “straight out lie” is not
government restriction but rather “the simple truth.”116 Rather than having
to recruit government coercion to defend against falsity, as individuals do
in the commercial realm or in certain security contexts, they can engage
in a kind of self-defense by using their own powers of thought and
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 723 (2012) (plurality opinion).
Id. at 752 (Alito, J., dissenting).
Varat, supra note 103, at 1108–1109.
Id.
Id. at 727 (plurality opinion).
Id.
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expression. Justice Alito did not agree that this stance applied to
Alvarez’s flagrant lie about his personal history.117 But with respect to
matters of public concern, he seemed to take the same approach that
Justice Kennedy took to the broader category of speech lacking legally
cognizable harm: it is for the marketplace of ideas to identify and correct,
not government intervention.118
The question this raises is whether there are times that (1) such selfdefense will be insufficient to combat a falsehood in expression; (2) the
First Amendment should permit government to offer speakers and
listeners some type of aid in this effort, of a kind government is normally
barred from providing in individuals’ efforts to identify falsehood and
resist being convinced by it; or (3) both. These two questions might each
receive separate answers. It might at first seem to follow that, if speakers
and listeners are unable to identify and avoid being duped by false
statements, then some form of government control is needed, and the
First Amendment should allow room for it. But it also may not be true
that the solution to ineffectual self-defense against falsehood is recruiting
government defense. Even if fake news or false speech raises a genuine
problem, government intervention may be an ineffective solution—or one
that, even if it succeeds, would bring even worse distortion into public
debate or personal reflection than the one it was designed to combat. As
the Court itself emphasized in Gertz, even where we cannot trust the
marketplace of ideas to separate truth and falsehood, there is good reason
to distrust government with that task even more strongly.119 If we wish to
carefully elaborate—and perhaps rethink—the common ground the
Justices laid out in Alvarez as we confront modern techniques and
technologies for spreading fake news, we thus have to offer separate
analysis of (1) the ways in which such fake news or similar
misinformation might be able to overwhelm our ability to analyze it and
counter the deception it aims to generate; and (2) what role, if any,
government might play in addressing this problem, and what alternatives
exist to government restriction where the latter would be intolerable given
our First Amendment commitments. In Part III, I briefly review how
some scholars have suggested the First Amendment may allow regulation
of fake news.
117. Id. at 739 (Alito, J., dissenting).
118. Id.
119. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340–41 (1974).
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III. Is There Deceptive Harm Without Legally Cognizable Harm?
Would the framework I have described above need reshaping, or
elaboration, to provide government with power to counter fake news, fake
video or audio, or other forms of false expression that have raised
concerns among journalists, legal commentators, and other observers?
There is reason to think so: even Justice Alito’s dissenting opinion in
Alvarez, the opinion most comfortable with utilizing government power
to regulate false statements, did not wish to leave the government with
power to restrict falsehoods that arise in robust debates about
“philosophy, religion, history, the social sciences, the arts, and other
matters of public concern.”120 When fake news sites report voter fraud or
other crimes by public figures that never happened, peddle conspiracy
theories about the American government orchestrating the September 11
attacks, or claim the Sandy Hook killings were staged, the false
information is not only flatly wrong, it is a flatly wrong claim about
politics, history, crime, or war. There is little doubt that the questions they
address are questions about matters of public concern—however insane
and untenable their answers to these questions may be. Thus, they are not
merely factually false statements, they are factually false statements that
fall into a category of false statement that even Justice Alito assumed—
and that all of the Court’s Justices agreed—are virtually off limits to
government restriction.
Might the First Amendment nonetheless leave government with room
to restrict or combat at least some of this falsehood? My main purpose in
this Part is to explore some possible answers to this question. The most
obvious possible avenue for justifying such regulation is to show that the
two categories of lies I have thus far treated as mutually exclusive—lies
that count as defamation or otherwise generate legally cognizable harms,
and lies about matters of public concern, such as political life, history,
and religion—can sometimes come packaged together in the same
statement. A lie might be about public affairs while also defaming
someone (such as a candidate it falsely describes as having committed a
crime).
In such a case, courts are likely to find that government may restrict or
penalize the false statement in spite of its connection to matters of public
concern in order to prevent the harm it causes. This, after all, is true of
other circumstances where the government regulates political speech that
120. Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 751 (Alito, J., dissenting).
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has a non-speech component, such as speech that threatens violence. A
protestor who is passionately expressing anger against Wall Street might
still be arrested if he expresses himself by blocking traffic at an
intersection or throwing a brick through the window of a bank. Likewise,
someone who incites website viewers to kill or injure doctors who
perform abortions is still subject to punishment for incitement even if he
can show his incitement is motivated by and expresses his strong protest
against abortion.121 The First Amendment will not insulate traffic
disruption, vandalism of property, or incitement to violence from
government restriction just because such actions are interwoven with a
political message.
Similarly, imagine that a blogger maliciously—and falsely—states that
a political figure is guilty of bribery. Further imagine that he does so
because he wants that political figure, who has called for faster trials and
harsher punishments, to understand what it is like to be falsely accused of
a crime. The political dimension of the blogger’s false accusation won’t
insulate him from liability for defamation. It will, to be sure, make it
harder for a plaintiff to prevail. Under existing free speech doctrine,
public figures can only prevail in a defamation case if they can show that
the defendant had actual malice in making a false claim—that is, that the
defendant knew the claim to be false or did so with reckless disregard of
its falsity.122 But assuming the public figure can meet this hurdle, he can
show the legally cognizable harm necessary to attack this falsehood free
from heightened First Amendment scrutiny. Thus, where fake news is not
merely fake, but is also harmful in a way that the law has viewed as the
basis of a common law claim, the First Amendment allows it to be
attacked by both the government and private litigants.
One might argue that where lies or other falsehoods serve a particularly
valuable First Amendment purpose, they should be shielded from
government punishment or civil liability even when they would otherwise
count as fraud. Justin Marceau and Alan Chen describe circumstances
where investigative journalists have to lie to uncover information about
lawbreaking or behavior that merits exposure and public

121. Planned Parenthood of Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. Am. Coal. of Life Activists,
290 F.3d 1058, 1079–80, 1085 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (finding that circulation of “wanted
poster” and web site displaying faces and personal information of doctors providing
abortions was unprotected by First Amendment).
122. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 281 (1964).
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condemnation.123 Just as police informants might perpetuate fraud that
would be illegal if they were not police informants, perhaps investigative
journalists should similarly be shielded from liability that would
otherwise apply when they lie in order to gain access to a facility that is
trying to keep secrets from the public. In other words, there may be First
Amendment benefits to information gathering that can succeed only with
dissimulation; perhaps these benefits transform what would otherwise be
low-value misrepresentation (amounting to fraud) into a crucial
component of high value expression.
This might also be true in other circumstances. David Han has argued
that autobiographical lies are valuable instruments of self-definition. A
person exercises autonomy in part by exercising control over how she
presents herself to the world.124 On Han’s account, such autobiographical
lies clearly merit constitutional protection when their intended effect is
“purely psychological”—that is, where its aim is to shape others’ beliefs
about the liar rather than to shape others’ actions in ways resulting in
“material harm.” 125 It is at least conceivable, however, that, in some
cases, a lie used as an essential part of such self-presentation—
particularly if made to counter a harsh representation of the person by
others in a community—might merit free speech protection even where it
fits the definition of fraud. Just as investigative journalists may need to
engage in deception that is normally impermissible to play a crucial role
in promoting self-government and raising public awareness of abuses of
power, so individual autonomy may likewise require deception of a kind
that is normally illegal or unethical.
For example, imagine a person who revises pages in his diary and then
refers to such a forgery in arranging a paid speaking engagement. It is
likely that person should face liability for using false information to
obtain payment he may not have obtained if he had been honest about his
personal history. But, if Han is correct that the power to mold one’s
biography, even with tall tales, is one variant of a power of self-definition
central to First Amendment purposes, then a court might pause before
imposing liability on use of such a power. It might use a framework like
Justice Breyer’s balancing test in Alvarez to ask whether the harm done

123. Chen & Marceau, supra note 103, at 1438.
124. David S. Han, Autobiographical Lies and the First Amendment’s Protection of SelfDefining Speech, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 70, 117–18 (2012).
125. Id.
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by a person’s creative forgery of his own past personal identity really
justifies punishing it in spite of its First Amendment benefits.
The major concern of this Essay, however, is not whether the
misrepresentations that all of the Justices in Alvarez regard as low value
might become high-value First Amendment activity in some
circumstances, and thus merit the kind of strict or heightened scrutiny
normally denied to them. It is rather the opposite inquiry: Are there times
when falsehoods that appear to be on matters of public concern might be
treated as akin to low-value speech and, thus, lose the strong First
Amendment protection they normally receive, making them potential
targets of government regulation? Might fake news or junk science fall
outside of the First Amendment entirely despite the fact that it is
presented and sometimes perceived as news or as science? Might a fake
video depicting a police shooting or battlefield bombing that never
occurred be denied First Amendment protection—even where there is no
legal argument presented that it contains defamation, or constitutes
incitement? If not, might it at least fall into a place with weaker First
Amendment protection?
One possible response to these questions is to criticize my assumption
that all or most examples of fake news would necessarily count as a part
of the categories of falsehoods about “philosophy, religion, history, the
social sciences, the arts, and other matters of public concern.” The
boundaries of such bodies of knowledge are unclear. Still, if the relevant
inquiry is whether the speech is on a “matter of public concern,” the
Supreme Court has interpreted this category very broadly. In Snyder v.
Phelps, a case that asked about the public-concern test in the context of
intentional infliction of emotional distress, the Supreme Court said that,
although “the boundaries of the public concern test are not well-defined,”
it generally encompasses speech that can “be fairly considered as relating
to any matter of political, social, or other concern to the community,” or
that “is a subject of legitimate news interest; that is, a subject of general
interest and of value and concern to the public.”126
There is little question, then, that most fake news would fit this
description if it weren’t fake. Consider false claims of voter fraud
designed to nullify the votes of certain groups of voters. Where real voter
fraud or voter suppression occurs, this is unquestionably a matter of
126. Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 452–53 (2011) (quotations marks omitted) (quoting
City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 83–84 (2004)).
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public concern. So although fake reports of voter fraud—such as those
circulated by the Russian operated Twitter account “Tennessee
GOP”127—are false, they are also about an issue of public concern.
But perhaps, one might argue, certain discrete statements that
individuals make in the course of making a statement of political import
should not automatically be treated as speech on matters of public
concern and, thus, insulated from government control. Imagine, for
example, that rather than simply stating that he was a Medal of Honor
winner and describing his battlefield heroics, Xavier Alvarez made this
statement as a prelude to another statement that “having experienced the
horrors of war,” he “knows better than most people why the United
States’ missile attacks in the Middle East are reckless in risking another
war.” In this circumstance, the statement made criminal by the Stolen
Valor Act (that Alvarez is a Medal of Honor winner) is simply an
autobiographical lie used to make a subsequent political claim more
persuasive. It seems unlikely, however, that Justice Alito would thus
classify it as a being a statement about a matter of public concern or as
insulated from government restriction on the ground that state restriction
of such claims would make it too easy for the “state to use its power for
political ends.”128 And some of the falsity in fake news is similar: when
Russian agents established the Twitter account “Tennessee GOP,” this
falsely portrayed them as an American, Tennessee-based Republican
party organization, but it did so as a prelude to their use of the Twitter
handle to make political statements about the election. Others within the
U.S. might similarly lie about their own pasts in order to frame the speech
they then make about political matters. Thus, the position of the Alvarez
dissent might allow the state to restrict at least this part of fake news and
junk science. And Justice Breyer’s concurrence could similarly subject it
to a balancing analysis of a sort that government might win.
But this seems problematic, especially given that “boundaries of the
public concern test are not well-defined.”129 Why should a verifiably false
biographical claim made in political discourse or historical argument be
any more vulnerable to government suppression than another verifiably
127. See Jake Lowary, Fake Tennessee GOP Twitter Account Highlighted in Indictment
of 13 Russians, TENNESSEAN (Feb. 16, 2018), https://www.tennessean.com/story/news/2018/
02/16/fake-tennessee-gop-twitter-account-highlighted-indictment-13-russians/345835002/.
128. United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 752 (2012) (Alito, J., dissenting).
129. Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 452 (2011) (quotation marks omitted) (quoting City
of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 83 (2004)).
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false claim made in such debates? Why, for example, is it any less
troublesome to punish Alvarez’s lie about past military experience he
never had than it would be to punish an intentionally false claim of his
about battlefield events that never really occurred? There may be answers
one can offer to such questions. But without clearer answers than those
provided by the Alvarez dissent, such considerations provide reason to
adhere to Justice Kennedy’s assumption that all false statements should
be treated like falsehoods in public discourse unless they raise the kind of
harms recognized to justify state intervention.
It is worth considering two other varieties of arguments that even such
falsehoods on matters of public concern should be subject to some
government restrictions or liability in spite of the risks that arise when the
First Amendment allows “the state to be the arbiter of truth.”130 Each
variety comes with its own line-drawing challenges. First, some scholars
have argued that where people lie to manipulate a listener, such
manipulation through false speech should be excluded from First
Amendment’s protection. Such manipulation, of course, might be
accomplished through speech about politics, history, and science. It might
also be accomplished by speech that is not necessarily defamatory and
does not defraud anybody of anything of value in the way that is typically
necessary for false speech to count as fraud under state law. Such
manipulation through falsehood may occur, for example, where a fake
news piece is designed to manipulate someone into supporting or
denouncing a candidate on the basis of false information.
The second argument concerns situations when a falsehood comes
from an expert or other speaker with an exclusive claim to certain
knowledge—one in whom listeners will predictably and justifiably place
their trust even when the speaker conveys her knowledge in public
discourse rather than in a fiduciary relationship. Freedom of speech,
Robert Post has argued, covers communication that a listener can
“autonomously query.”131 But certain kinds of expert knowledge don’t fit
this description—certain knowledge is produced by experts whom the
listener is poorly positioned to question. One might argue that even where
such an asymmetry occurs in public discourse, there are situations where
government might have at least limited power to assure it is not abused.
130. Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 752 (Alito, J., dissenting).
131. Robert Post, Recuperating First Amendment Doctrine, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1249, 1254
(1995).
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A. Manipulation Through Falsehoods
One circumstance in which courts might allow government to restrict
falsehoods—even when such falsehoods deal with political issues or
other matters of public concern—is where doing so is necessary to
prevent manipulative lying or manipulation through other false statements
of fact.
About twenty years before United States v. Alvarez was decided, David
Strauss argued that the First Amendment should not protect a speaker’s
use of lies to manipulate a listener such that the listener serves the
speaker’s ends rather than her own.132 In fact, says Strauss, such
manipulative lying not only lacks First Amendment value, it violates
what he takes to be the core principle underlying First Amendment
doctrine: the “persuasion principle.”133 The persuasion principle, as
Strauss explains, stems from one of the most valuable functions of
speech, and the one that the First Amendment is largely designed to
protect—namely, the function speech performs when it “persuades,”
inducing the listener to “action through a process that a rational person
would value.”134 When a person gets a chance to hear and consider acting
on ideas, even ideas the state views as dangerous, she is exercising her
autonomy vis-à-vis her right to decide upon, and act according to, her
own ends. But when the listener is deceived by false speech, she is doing
something that autonomous and rational people never want to do: build
their actions upon confidence in false factual premises. Moreover, where
these false factual premises are fed to her by a speaker who uses them to
steer her in ways she would never move herself, her autonomy is not only
left unsupported, it is undermined, making the listener a tool of the
speaker rather than an agent forming and acting on her own rational
decisions.
As a consequence, Strauss concludes that while the First Amendment’s
support for an individual’s intellectual autonomy normally requires it to
restrain the state from interfering in the processes by which individuals
try to persuade each other, the same is not true when those proposals are
manipulative lies.135 Far from enhancing autonomy, such “[l]ying is the
132. David A. Strauss, Persuasion, Autonomy, and Freedom of Expression, 91 COLUM.
L. REV 334, 355 (1991).
133. Id. at 335.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 354.
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clearest case of the coercion-like, autonomy-invading manipulation that
the persuasion principle is intended to prevent.”136 This is, thus, “a core
area in which the harm of private manipulation seems great enough to
justify government restrictions on speech.”137
The consequence of such a framework depends heavily on what makes
a lie count as manipulative. On one, fairly broad understanding of what
constitutes manipulation, Strauss’s exclusion of manipulative lies from
the First Amendment’s scope in some ways could provide a striking
contrast with the positions taken by the Justices in United States v.
Alvarez. This is true when manipulation might occur even where it leads
merely to the adoption of certain beliefs or attitudes held by a listener,
without some concrete action that the speaker desires the listener to take.
It might also be true where the lying is designed to produce a specific
action by the listener, but one without any legally cognizable harm.
In either case, Strauss’s approach would be different than Justice
Kennedy’s argument in the plurality opinion, where lies and other false
statements of fact lose First Amendment protection only when they cause
legally cognizable harm.138 After all, it is hard to argue that such legally
cognizable harm results from all lies that are manipulative in the broad
sense described above. If Alvarez tells a person that he has engaged in
heroic activity on the battlefield, but does so in an attempt to win
admiration rather than to defraud his listener of money, such a lie is
manipulative because it aims to get the listener to react in ways he would
not react but for the lie. But it is unlikely its manipulation would count as
the kind of legally cognizable harm that would justify a lawsuit or
criminal penalty.
Manipulative lying of this kind would also likely be provided First
Amendment protection by all the Justices in Alvarez where it not only
lacks legally cognizable harm but also deals with issues of politics,
history, philosophy, or other matters of public concern. This is the kind of
manipulative lying that one might find in articles, tweets, or Facebook
posts that spread fake news. Consider, for example, a tweet that makes a
false claim about immigrant crime rates in order to motivate its readers to
oppose legislative approval of the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrival
Act (DACA). If the author of the tweet realizes the information she is
136. Id. at 366.
137. Id.
138. United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 719 (2012) (plurality opinion).
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sharing is false and shares it anyway in order to generate political
opposition to DACA, she is manipulating her readers with false
information. So long as the claim does not defame particular individuals
or organizations, however, this lie is likely to be the kind of lie that the
Justices in Alvarez were unwilling to exclude from First Amendment
coverage and to which they would have provided the same robust First
Amendment protection that covers accurate claims about politics or
political opinions.
But Strauss’s approach is not inevitably in conflict with the Alvarez
opinions. As noted above, how much room Strauss’s framework provides
for government restriction of false statements on political matters, or
other matters of public concern, would depend on how one defines what
counts as manipulative.
One important question is what exactly is denied First Amendment
protection by a proposal denying it to “false statements of fact by private
speakers.”139 It seems clear that Strauss means to exclude lying—a
situation where the false statement of fact is known to be false by the
speaker. The speaker “inject[s] her own false information into the thought
processes of the listener for the purpose of making those processes
produce the outcome that the speaker desires.”140
But lying is not the only way a listener’s thought processes can become
infected by false information. A listener can also receive false
information from a speaker who genuinely believes that the false
information is true. This kind of deception occurs, for example, when a
conspiracy theorist spreads false information, such as a story that a school
shooting was staged by the federal government to justify greater gun
control, not in order to intentionally deceive someone but to convince the
listener of something the speaker believes. On the one hand, the outcome
is still in tension with the persuasion principle. A “rational person,”
Strauss argues, “never wants to act on the basis of false information,” and
by urging such a person to act on the basis of false information, the
conspiracy theorist is urging someone to act irrationally even though the
conspiracy theorist is subject to the same delusion.141 On the other hand,
from the conspiracy’s theorist own vantage point, she is, unlike a liar,
doing something the First Amendment staunchly protects: trying to
139. Strauss, supra note 132, at 366.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 335.
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convince someone else to adopt her own conclusions by presenting what
she regards as valid evidence for such conclusions. And it seems quite
likely that much of the fake news spread on Twitter is believed to be true
by those who disseminate it.
Second, one might question not only whether the manipulative use of
falsehood loses First Amendment protection even when it is deception
other than lying, but also what counts as manipulative for purposes of
applying this principle.142 Consider, again, why lying is a perfect example
of the “coercion-like, autonomy-invading manipulation that the
persuasion principle is intended to prevent.”143 It is because a “speaker
tells a lie in order to influence the listener’s behavior, . . . making it serve the
speaker’s ends instead of the listener’s.”144 What kind of goals count as
influencing behavior, or making someone serve the speaker’s ends? In cases
where such manipulation might amount to fraud, it is because the victim of
the fraud has been tricked into paying money or sacrificing something else of
value. It seems likely that manipulation has also occurred where someone lies
to a voter in order to get that voter to cast her vote for the opposing candidate.
But in many false statements of fact online, the goal is vaguer. The false
statement is not intended to generate a specific action, but rather to generate
anger or disdain in the listener towards a certain political or social group. In
other words, the false statement is not made in order to get them to take a
specified action, but rather to encourage a general opposition to certain
political views or leaders. Consider some of the information spread by the
Russian Internet Research Agency, whose members have now been indicted
by a grand jury for various violations of United States law.145 This group
spread information on Twitter making false claims, for example, about voter
fraud by Hillary Clinton.146 But their goal was not simply to motivate readers
to vote against Clinton, but instead to “sow discord in the U.S. political
system.”147 In some cases, liars may wish to spread information just because
they want others to share their ideology, perhaps to advance it in practical

142. This is a question that has also been discussed in other analyses of lying’s First
Amendment status. See, e.g., Han, supra note 124, at 115–19 (exploring how one can draw a
distinction between lies with “purely psychological effects” and thus that result in harm).
143. Strauss, supra note 132, at 366.
144. Id.
145. Indictment, supra note 28.
146. Id. at 19.
147. Id. at 4.
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ways in some future day or perhaps, in the near term, simply to make the
ideology less of a fringe belief.
First Amendment principles provide good reason to err on the side of
adopting narrower, more restrictive answers to the above questions. First,
it is dangerous to give government significant power to punish, or subject
to liability, those who spread falsehoods that they believe to be true.
Again, if we passionately defend statements about politics that we believe
to be true, we are engaging in—what from our perspective—is persuasive
speech of the kind that lies at the core of the First Amendment. Where
someone’s reputation is at stake, the law will sometimes make us liable for
false statements we believe to be true. Individuals can sometimes be liable for
defamation even when their reporting of false information is negligent or
reckless rather than intentional lying. But applying the same standards of
negligence or recklessness to general public statements would likely chill
great swathes of public discourse. Second, if manipulation is defined broadly
enough to include all effects a speaker desires to cause in a listener’s mind or
disposition to take further unspecified action, then virtually all lying would
become manipulative lying.
Such considerations weigh in favor of defining “manipulative” quite
narrowly. And Strauss seems to lean this way: in calling for the exclusion of
false statements from the First Amendment’s scope, he adds the caveat that,
although letting the government restrict “false statements of fact by private
speakers . . . will do more good than harm,” doing so is likely to be safe for
First Amendment freedom only if “the category of false statements of fact
is . . . defined very narrowly.”148
The upshot of this analysis is that Strauss’s arguments for excluding
manipulative lying from the scope of First Amendment protection aren’t
likely to leave much more speech unprotected than the Justices in Alvarez
already did when they concluded that lying causing legally cognizable harm
is outside the scope of the First Amendment. This is true because if
manipulative lies are defined narrowly to cover only those lies where a
speaker uses falsity to cause the listener to act in a specific way, many such
lies will, in any event, count as fraud or some other already recognized
legally cognizable harm.
Such narrowness in defining manipulative lies is also important for
another reason. Even when lying is manipulative in that it is aimed at making
a listener embrace certain beliefs she would otherwise reject, and perhaps
148. Strauss, supra note 132, at 366.
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then act in accord with those beliefs, some of the lies scholars and judges
identify as valuable may have this character—at least, if the category of
manipulative lies is defined too broadly. As David Han argues,
autobiographical lying is often used by individuals to engage in selfdefinition.149 While listeners may not want to be deceived by such lies from
others, they might strongly prefer a world where such autobiographical lying
is legal, and thus constitutionally protected, so they remain free to engage it
themselves. Remaining vulnerable to such deception, in other words, may be
a price they are willing to pay if that is the only way they can retain for
themselves the continued freedom to present themselves in the way they wish
to be seen. They may likewise want to live with the risk of being deceived by
an investigative journalist if doing so is the price they have to pay for such
journalists to expose dangers they and their fellow citizens need to know
about.
B. Expert Truths
The premise I explored in the last subsection was that it is not at odds with
the First Amendment for government to assume that all individuals have a
duty to avoid manipulating others with false information. But it is also
possible to conceive a narrower truth-telling duty, one that generally binds
not all individuals, but only those who have expert or specialized knowledge
or, for some other reason, have to be trusted by listeners. As Robert Post
writes, much of our knowledge of the world comes not from direct
perception, but rather from what we learn from scientific experts, historians,
or other experts whose methods for producing that knowledge are quite
different from the chaotic debates one finds in public discourse. As Post
writes, “[E]xpert knowledge requires exactly what normal First Amendment
doctrine prohibits.”150 Where normal public discourse requires that we decide
for ourselves what opinions to embrace, without government or any other
authority ordering us to favor one opinion over another, science, history, and
journalism can produce content “we have reason to trust” only if the right
kinds of experts can “distinguish meritorious from specious” claims.151
It is not always the case, however, that affirmations by experts or others
with privileged knowledge (such as an eyewitness) are required, by law, to be
accurate. That depends on the context in which they occur. In certain
149. Han, supra note 124, at 115.
150. ROBERT C. POST, DEMOCRACY, EXPERTISE, AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM: A FIRST
AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE FOR THE MODERN STATE 9 (2012).
151. Id. at 13.
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circumstances, experts have a legal duty to provide statements consistent with
the standards of their discipline. This occurs, for example, when an expert is
hired to provide medical or legal services. A doctor who has agreed to treat a
patient has to answer that patient’s medical inquiry with an answer that
constitutes competent practice of medicine. And a lawyer has to provide her
client with competent legal advice. Similarly, expert witnesses at trial are
bound to provide honest answers about their knowledge and may not be
called upon to do so unless their expertise is genuine and is of the kind that
will be helpful to the trier of fact in addressing particular questions.
But in the realm of public discourse, even such experts are no longer
bound to voice disciplinary wisdom. Whereas a doctor’s advice is supposed
to accord with standards of her profession in her treatment of a patient, she is
not similarly constrained when she writes a book or a newspaper column. In
“speech to the general public,” writes Post, a doctor (or other expert) has free
speech rights they do not have in the conversations they have with their
patients.152 The doctor might even receive protection if she falsely claims, for
example, that evidence shows vaccination increases the risk of autism when it
does not. Of course, she may suffer the opprobrium of colleagues and others
in the medical community if she makes false or misleading medical claims in
public discourse. She may find it difficult to publish an article about
vaccination in any journal highly regarded within the medical community.
But, thanks to the First Amendment, she cannot suffer a penalty at the hands
of the state or federal government.153
How does this relate to fake news or junk science? It is useful to focus on
the latter example first. One might argue that perhaps—even in public
discourse, on matters of public concern—the government ought to be able to
impose limits on when experts can invoke their reputation to promote, as
confirmed facts, claims that are roundly rejected by everyone else in their
field. This is a possibility Jane Bambauer has recently explored in her
scholarship. Where an expert’s false statement is likely to be relied upon by a
listener in ways that cause harm, she argues, the statement’s falsity should be
fair game for government restriction even if it occurs in public discourse.154
Rather than generating rules for “false statements of fact,” she instead
considers how different First Amendment rules might apply to three
categories of knowledge she calls “accepted knowledge,” “contested
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Jane Bambauer, Snake Oil, 92 WASH. L. REV. 73, 76 (2018).
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knowledge,” and “anti-knowledge.”155 The first and third of these categories,
respectively, are refinements of what many others call true and false
knowledge. Accepted knowledge consists of knowledge that is “supported by
enough observations and credible evidence to clear the high bar established
by the relevant experts” and others who are able to apply whatever
epistemological standards determine what observation and evidence are
sufficient.156 Anti-knowledge includes “statements that are in direct conflict
with the statements contained in accepted knowledge,” such as “sets of
claims that have been proven, based on prevailing scientific standards, to be
incorrect.”157 In between these two categories is contested knowledge,
consisting of “claims that may have some evidence in support, and perhaps
some evidence in conflict, but not enough of either sort to conclusively place
the statement into the accepted knowledge or anti-knowledge buckets.”158
While government can, of course, already restrict anti-knowledge where it
comes in the form of bad medical advice given by a doctor to a patient,
Bambauer argues that “government should also be permitted regulate antiknowledge within the public discourse so long as the claim is likely to cause
the listeners to take action that puts themselves or others in serious risk of
harm, and the speaker has a sufficiently culpable mental state.”159 This
argument is focused on scientific knowledge in public discourse, and she
illustrates it by questioning the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion in Winter v. G.P.
Putnam & Sons that the publishers of a reference book called “The
Encyclopedia of Mushrooms” could not be liable, under product liability law,
for identifying dangerous mushrooms as safe to eat.160
It is not clear how much application such an analysis might have to
journalism, to claims about politics or history, or to areas of science where a
person’s health, safety, or property are not at stake. Junk science and bad
medicine can lead individuals to place themselves in danger (for example, by
eating poisonous mushrooms they fail to realize are poisonous). Erroneous
directions on a chart or map can likewise cause trouble by leading someone

155. Id. at 111–12.
156. Id. at 85.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 86.
159. Id. at 133.
160. Id. at 89–90 (citing Winter v. G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 938 F.2d 1033, 1037-38 (9th Cir.
1991)) (finding that the content of books were not suitable subjects for product liability
claims).
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into dangerous territory.161 But it seems less likely that equally concrete
harms will flow from falsehoods about politics or history. Individuals may
regret a vote they cast on the basis of inaccurate political information or a
protest they attended to express outrage against an event that never occurred.
But such regrets are similar to the abandoned spiritual or ideological
commitments which, as I noted earlier, individuals can’t treat as harms
sufficient to create legal liability for those who lured them into a religious or
political movement. A journalist’s flawed reporting might conceivably cause
more harm—if, for example, it includes inaccurate descriptions of dangerous
events (such as an impending tornado). But the question that needs answering
here is why the First Amendment should allow any greater restriction of such
speech in public discourse than it already does when it permits people to sue
for defamation or intentional infliction of emotional distress, or allows the
state to punish incitement, true threats, commercial speech, and low-value
speech.
The same question could arise about another variant of this argument: it is
also possible, one might claim, that First Amendment law could treat certain
false claims even by non-experts as subject to duties to avoid harmful false
statements about facts to which a speaker has exclusive access. A comparison
with trial evidence may be helpful here. It is not only the expert witness who
brings to such a trial knowledge to which he has special claim. Rather, it is
also the lay witnesses who have directly perceived events or other aspects of
the world that no one else might have seen or heard.162 Just as the expert
witness must testify honestly regarding the subject of his expertise, the lay
witness is under an obligation to testify honestly about his experiences.
Public discourse, of course, is not subject to the same constraint. If I write a
blog post about events I have seen or heard or describe them in response to
inquiries by a reporter, I am not under the same obligation to tell the truth that
I am when I am on the witness stand. One might argue, however, that where a
lie about my personalized knowledge will predictably cause certain harms to
individuals who rely upon this knowledge to make certain decisions, then
such a lie should perhaps be more vulnerable to government restriction than a
lie I tell about some other subject (which no one has any need to rely upon).
But again, one may ask, why doesn’t existing free speech doctrine on lowvalue categories of speech—or other speech outside the boundaries of the
First Amendment—already provide all the guidance one needs for addressing
161. Id. at 91.
162. FED. R. EVID. 701.
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when dishonest reports of personalized knowledge may be punished or
subjected to civil liability? Why not hold, as Justice Kennedy argued in
Alvarez, that a false report of an event may be punished when one lies to a
police officer or other government official; when one commits perjury, or
defrauds or defames someone; or when one otherwise causes a harm the legal
system has recognized as a basis for a lawsuit or prosecution instead of
granting the state the potentially dangerous power to punish any falsehood
that it can characterize as a source of harm? Answering such a question once
again depends on discussing line drawing and describing more specifically
how the line between speech where reliance interests are and aren’t present in
public discourse would differ from the line drawn in Kennedy’s plurality
opinion between lies that cause legally cognizable harm and those that do not.
IV. Free Speech and the Future of Forgery
When someone critically assesses an argument, like the one I am
making in this Essay, they can do so without seeing the world as I see it
or asking me to provide facts in my sole possession. Someone might read
this piece, consider its claims and the reasons it offers them, and decide
that the reasons don’t convince her. They might do the same with any of
the opinions in United States v. Alvarez. One does not have to learn about
previously unknown facts, or rely heavily on social science or other data,
to come to the conclusion that they disagree with some of the reasoning
of Justice Kennedy’s plurality opinion, Justice Breyer’s concurrence, or
Justice Alito’s dissent. Of course, certain data may well be helpful in
judging certain claims within such arguments. It might be good to have
data, for example, on the psychological processes that occur as
individuals try to evaluate arguments. But such data isn’t essential for a
reader to make some judgments about the persuasiveness of any of these
opinions, or a law review essay about them. This is thus one situation
where individuals at least have the potential to act as their own watchmen
for truth. In any event, this is not a role government can constitutionally
wrest from individuals through use of its coercive power: we cannot trust
government to mandate which arguments we should accept and which we
should reject. And even though some questions require an authoritative
answer from a court or legislature so that law and policy can take a
certain form, that only means that we have to live under that decision, not
that we have to agree with it or consider it correct.
A person is typically less self-reliant, however, when assessing a
factual claim about the external world. There aren’t many such claims I
am in a position to test against my own personal experience. Rather, I rely
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on a complex array of social practices and practical realities to help me
expand my factual knowledge beyond the very narrow sample of reality I
can perceive by myself. For example, if I wanted to know, while in
Oklahoma, the weather conditions in New York City, I would have to call
a friend there and ask them, watch a weather report on TV that provides
that information, or check a weather-oriented website or smartphone app.
Similarly, almost the entirety of my knowledge of the facts central to the
nation’s political life comes second- or third-hand as well; indeed, I don’t
interact with the key players in Congress or the Executive Department
regularly and have met only a few of them. Thus, my knowledge of what
President Trump or members of the Senate or House of Representatives
are doing each week has to come from other reports whose veracity I can
trust—this time not from distant friends, but from the journalists who, as
the Supreme Court once said, “act as the ‘eyes and ears’ of the public.”163
At times, the inaccessibility of a factual claim results not only from the
great distance or other barriers between me and the fact or event I can’t
directly observe, but also because it is the kind of fact the world conceals
from our senses entirely until experts use scientific experimentation and
analysis to extract it. We only know about the role DNA plays in cell
function and reproduction or about the properties of electrons, for
example, because scientists have been able to learn such information from
a systematic study of the world.164
The inaccessibility of facts to any one individual raises another
potential challenge for the First Amendment model that the Supreme
Court developed during the mid-to-late twentieth century and that served
as crucial background for United States v. Alvarez. That is, we can act as
our own watchmen for truth, when it comes to factual claims, but not
because we are capable of perceiving most of the factual realm directly.
We clearly aren’t. Rather, we play this role only because we can rely on
and trust in a complex set of social institutions and practical technologies
to reveal aspects of the world to us. Americans and members of certain
other Western societies can learn about and monitor their countries’
political life only because they can rely, to some extent, on journalists,
historians, and, at times, fellow citizens to share and aggregate
information about such events. We can understand the hidden
163. Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 8 (1978).
164. POST, supra note 150, at 1, 7 (“In fact I have learned about the carcinogenic
properties of cigarettes by studying the conclusions of those whom I have reason to trust.”).
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characteristics of the world that scientists uncover only if the scientific
community accurately and honestly uses its disciplinary study to uncover
this realm and vet the work of other scientists to assure it is reliable.
In a sense, these social practices extend our perception. Video and
audio technology are perhaps the most obvious examples of such
extended perception: they allow us to see and hear events that we cannot
witness personally. But we also rely on other individuals’ perception—
like that of journalists or the individuals interview by journalists—and
treat it as a basis for knowledge about the world.
One starting point for elaborating and perhaps revising the consensus
understandings in United States v. Alvarez165 is to make it clear that the
First Amendment should, if possible, leave the government with room to
protect us not only from false speech that causes us material harm but
also from falsity that inserts itself into, or convincingly disguises itself as,
at least some of the channels of indirect knowledge that we crucially rely
upon to deliver perceptional experiences beyond those which we can
create for ourselves.166
And modern technology has, in some ways, made us far more
vulnerable to such attacks on the knowledge ecosystem for this purpose.
As noted earlier, the rise of computer technology has made certain kinds
of forgeries and imitations easier. This is, in part, perhaps because we
have altered some of the aspects of the knowledge ecosystem in ways that
make it easier to fake. For example, we increasingly communicate by
email or text messaging in circumstances where we would have
previously used a phone call. Where we once might have had a good
basis to know it was really our employer, colleague, or friend contacting
us on the phone with new, important information about significant
developments in the world, we may now find that we too quickly accept
as real an email purporting to be from that employer, colleague, or friend
but that really is from someone who is imitating them to manipulate us.
Thus, cybersecurity specialists now face the challenge of helping people
avoid falling for “spear-phishing” emails, wherein attackers “disguise
165. For instance, that false statements on matters of public concern are fully protected
unless they cause legally cognizable harm. See 567 U.S. 709, 719–20 (2012).
166. See Jonathan Adler, Epistemological Problems of Testimony, STANFORD
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. Winter 2017, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2017/entries/
testimony-episprob/ (noting that every person has no choice but to rely on reports, the
accuracy of which one cannot “check on . . . for oneself”; rather, we must “depen[d] on the
reliability and sincerity of others, often strangers or mere acquaintances”).

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2018

104

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71:59

themselves as a trustworthy friend or entity to acquire sensitive
information,” using information about the intended victim such as “their
friends, hometown, employer, locations they frequent, and what they
have recently bought online.”167 Some such attacks also disguise
themselves as internal company emails, using information gathered from
surveillance of companies.
Our increasing reliance on internet-based communication may likewise
make us vulnerable not only to fake personal communications but also to
fake news. Now that newspapers are on websites, the code or design of
which can be easily copied by digital means, creating fake versions of
established newspapers is far simpler than it was when newspaper
production relied on possessing and using a powerful printing press. And
fake newspaper creators who are unwilling to risk subjecting themselves
to trademark infringement suit from the New York Times, the Miami
Herald, Time Magazine, or another publication might instead create an
entirely fake publication with the appearance and feel of a real newspaper
or magazine. The creator of the Christian Times Newspaper, the fake
publication that ran a made-up story about election fraud, attempted to do
this. Legitimate news sites themselves have arguably contributed to this
problem. When a news network’s home page includes links not only to
the journalism it produces itself but also to commercially sponsored
“stories” that nonetheless have an appearance very similar to those of the
news network, this risks confusing readers about what content is
produced according to the normal practices of journalists and what is
offered by commercial entities who are doing so with an eye to encourage
particular types of consumer behavior.
As noted before, developments in audio- and video-editing technology
raise an even more significant threat. Almost twenty years ago, in 1998,
science fiction writer and technologist David Brin warned, “One of the
scariest predictions now circulating is that we are about to leave the era of
photographic proof. . . . We are fast reaching the point where expertly
controlled computers can adjust an image, pixel by microscopic pixel,
and not leave a clue behind.”168 Now, many articles are reporting such a
167. Nena Giandomenico, What Is Spear-Phishing? Defining and Differentiating SpearPhishing from Phishing, DIG. GUARDIAN BLOG (June 27, 2016), https://digital
guardian.com/blog/what-is-spear-phishing-defining-and-differentiating-spear-phishing-andphishing.
168. DAVID BRIN, THE TRANSPARENT SOCIETY: WILL TECHNOLOGY FORCE US TO CHOOSE
BETWEEN PRIVACY AND FREEDOM? 28 (1998).
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similar technological transformation is occurring not just in the realm of
still pictures but also in the realm of audio-visual recording. National
Public Radio (NPR), The Verge, and other media outlets, for example,
recently ran stories on a Canadian company called Lyrebird that,
according to NPR, has “come up with a way to recreate anyone’s voice
and get it to say almost anything.”169 It uses computer algorithms to
capture the distinctive features of someone’s voice from a voice sample
as short as a minute in length. Programs can then produce a voice eerily
similar to that of Donald Trump, Barack Obama, or any other voice they
analyze and instruct it to say whatever content is fed to it. The voices
produced are still noticeably artificial, but this technology will only
improve.170 And, as The Verge reports, Lyrebird’s audio simulation
technology can reportedly “infuse the speech it creates with emotion,
letting [users of the software] make voices” that they simulate “sound
angry, sympathetic, or stressed out.”171 Further, Lyrebird is not the only
company creating such technology. Google has also produced technology
for simulating distinctive voices, and Adobe’s Project VoCo “can edit
human speech like Photoshop tweaks digital images.”172
Other researchers at the University of Washington and Stanford have
generated tools for manipulating video of speakers. Using this
technology, a video of Donald Trump or Barack Obama can be altered so
that it shows their lips forming words they never said, to go with the
fabricated audio of words they never voiced.173 As The Guardian notes,
this “new breed of video and audio manipulation tools, made possible by
advances in artificial intelligence and computer graphics, . . . will allow
for the creation of realistic looking footage of public figures appearing to
say [] anything.”174 The article describes this as “the future of fake news”
and noted it means we will have to question not only “everything we
169. New Software Can Mimic Anyone’s Voice, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (May 5, 2017),
http://www.npr.org/2017/05/05/527013820/.
170. See James Vincent, Lyrebird Claims It Can Recreate Any Voice Using Just One
Minute of Sample Audio, VERGE (Apr. 24, 2017, 12:04 PM), https://www.theverge.
com/2017/4/24/15406882, (“The results certainly aren’t indistinguishable from human
speech, but they’re impressive all the same, and will no doubt improve over time.”).
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Olivia Solon, The Future of Fake News: Don’t Believe Everything You Read, See or
Hear, GUARDIAN (Jul. 26, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/jul/26/fakenews-obama-video-trump-face2face-doctored-content.
174. Id.
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read, but soon we’ll have to question everything we see and hear as
well.”175 As with audio simulation, the video simulation is not quite yet
good enough to fool a careful observer.176
One widely discussed version of this fabricated reality is the deep fake, a
video scene that, as discussed above, shows someone doing something they
didn’t actually do, thanks to sophisticated computer technology that imposes
their face on the body of the person actually in the video footage. The
computer technology involves a kind of artificial intelligence called “deep
learning” (hence the name “deep fake”).177 To date, the technology’s most
noticed use has been to create pornography films featuring celebrities who
neither appeared in them nor consented to have their image use for such
purposes.
But like other forms of fake video and audio, deep fakes can be used for
other malicious purposes. As discussed in the introduction, a recent
Lawfare blog post uses the term deep fake to describe alteration of an
image, video, or audio source to make it appear that someone did
something that they did not actually do—and with such technological
sophistication that the “unaided observer cannot detect the fake.”178 Such
fabrication of reality, the blog post notes, can create havoc for the way
individuals understand the world and thus unbalance their foundation for
action.179 Moreover, such fabrications might not only gull individuals into
taking actions with negative personal consequences, but also may lead to
harms that tear “the very fabric of democracy”—for example, by generating
fake evidence of race-based violence or of war crimes.180 Interestingly, the
authors stress the threat raised by deep fakes by revising the same metaphor
that Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes used to explain, in 1919, why First
175. Id.
176. Greg Kumparak, This System Instantly Edits Videos to Make It Look Like You’re
Saying Something You’re Not, TECHCRUNCH (Mar. 18, 2016), https://techcrunch.com/2016/
03/18/this-system-instantly-edits-videos-to-make-it-look-like-youre-saying-somethingyoure-not (“It’s not pixel-perfect yet—even in the relatively low-res clips we’re shown,
there’s an uncanny valley effect of something being not quite right.”).
177. James Vincent, Why We Need A Better Definition of ‘Deepfake’, VERGE (May 22,
2018, 2:53 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2018/5/22/17380306/deepfake-definition-aimanipulation-fake-news.
178. Bobby Chesney and Danielle Citron, Deep Fakes: A Looming Crisis for National
Security, Democracy and Privacy?, LAWFARE (Feb. 21, 2018), https://www.lawfareblog.
com/deep-fakes-looming-crisis-national-security-democracy-and-privacy.
179. Id.
180. Id.
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Amendment speech rights must have limits. Holmes “warned a century ago
of the danger of shouting fire in a crowded theater”; with the use of deep
fakes, “now those false cries might go viral, fueled by the persuasive power
of hyper-realistic evidence in conjunction with the distribution powers of
social media.”181
As many writers have noted, more primitive equivalents of such tools
are already being used by those who wish to commit fraud. Already,
many criminals are trying to use fake identities to commit computer
crime or other crime that requires deception.182 As the fact-checking
website Snopes.com describes the scheme, “a scam artist gleans just
enough information about a family (e.g., names, ages, addresses, phone
numbers) to be able to impersonate one of them during a brief phone call
to another family member.”183 The scam artist then calls a member of the
family—usually a grandparent—claiming to be the grandchild and facing
significant distress and in need of money.184 Such scams have worked
even without the technology I have described above. Such a scam could,
of course, be far more convincing if the impersonator could not only use
the grandchild’s name and other information, but also a carbon copy of
her voice. This technology also gives criminals methods of creating even
more damaging versions of the spear-phishing emails described above.
Instead of an email from your employer asking you to provide certain
sensitive information to a certain email address or wire money to a bank
account, you might receive a phone call in which such an instruction
comes from a simulation of your employer’s voice.
There are, to be sure, already laws that allow government to
aggressively pursue and seek punishment for criminals who use such
methods. The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act already criminalizes using
some of these methods to gain unauthorized access to computer
information (or access that exceeds what is authorized).185 Identity theft
and wire fraud laws might also apply. Many states have laws defining and
imposing punishment on “criminal impersonation” or “false

181. Id.
182. See Family Member Impersonation Scam,
https://www.snopes.com/fact-check/the-family-way/.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2) (2012).
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personation.”186 Oklahoma’s statutes, for example, make it a crime to
“falsely personate another” and perform certain actions in that “assumed
character.”187 One violates this law, when, while impersonating another
person, one “[s]ubscribes, verifies, publishes, acknowledges or proves, in
the name of another person, any written instrument, with intent that the
same may be delivered or used as true.”188 One likewise violates the law
when one performs actions that would, if done by the victim of the
impersonation, make the latter “liable to any suit or prosecution, or to pay
any sum of money, or to incur any charge, forfeiture or penalty” or that
brings “any benefit . . . to the party personating, or to any other
person.”189
It is unlikely any of these legal restrictions on impersonation or misuse
of others’ identity would face First Amendment difficulties. As noted
above, even the opinion in Alvarez that extended the strongest free speech
protection to false statements of fact, that of Justice Kennedy, emphasized
that “[w]here false claims are made to effect a fraud or secure moneys or
other valuable considerations, say offers of employment, it is well
established that the Government may restrict speech without affronting
the First Amendment.”190 The crime of false personation seems to fit
squarely within this category of entirely unprotected lying. So too do all
of the spear-phishing attacks I have described, as well as the analogues of
such attacks that might be carried out with fabricated video- or audiorecordings.
The more difficult question is whether, and when, the law may also
criminalize, or subject to civil liability, the use of such techniques to
create fake news, to disguise content as expert knowledge when it is not,
or to otherwise inject false content into public discourse. Should
government have greater power to prevent such manipulation of
communicative media or sources than it has, under the Alvarez
framework, to punish false statements?
The proposal I wish to briefly consider here is that judges and scholars
should be open to answering yes—at least in some circumstances. Even if
the Justices were right to assume in Alvarez that the false content of a
186. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 529(a) (West 2011); 21 OKLA. STAT. § 1531(4)
(2011); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 190.25 (McKinney 2008).
187. 21 OKLA. STAT. § 1531(4).
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 723 (2012).

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol71/iss1/5

2018]

LIES, LINE DRAWING & (DEEP) FAKE NEWS

109

statement about politics, history, or other matters of public concern
should not by itself normally suffice to eliminate First Amendment
protection, the rule might different for methods that distort the medium
that carries it. This is because, at least right now, we do not have the same
repertoire of tools for dealing with falsified mediums or sources that we
have for uncovering false claims. When confronted by a false statement
from an individual or organization on Twitter or in a Facebook post, we
can conceivably respond with skepticism—and then withhold acceptance
of the claim until we see it confirmed by some more reliable source, such
as multiple reports from professional journalists or video footage showing
that the event described on Twitter or Facebook. By contrast, if this
reliable journalistic or video check is itself rendered unreliable by
widespread and easy-to-implement falsification methods, and particularly
methods which (to quote Lawfare once again) make it impossible for an
“unaided observer” to “detect the fake,” it is hard to see what basis of
knowledge we will have to fall back on.
There is, of course, a counterargument: we can learn to bring the same
skepticism to audio and video evidence that many people already show to
verbal reports. Indeed, as some who make this counterargument point out,
such increased skepticism has already arisen for photos. In response to
concerns about malicious uses of Lyrebird’s technology, for instance, one
representative of Lyrebird stated that just as people “are now aware that
photos can be faked,” they will, in the future, regard “audio recording” as
“less and less reliable.”191 If an unaided observer cannot detect that a deep
fake video is fake, she might perhaps withhold judgment about its
accuracy until she can obtain the aid needed to meet that challenge—such
as the aid of an expert in forensic video analysis, or in fact-checking
suspicious visual evidence.
Such a response, however, at the very least requires elaboration. It is
true, of course, that in earlier times, when we lacked any technology for
creating video and audio evidence, we had to find some way to form
beliefs about faraway events without it. But it is not clear how well
modern life can function in a situation where photographic evidence,
audio-recording, and video-recording can be used not only to fabricate
reality, but also to fabricate the other sources of indirect knowledge that
we might use to test it against. If the absence of video and audio evidence

191. See Vincent, supra note 170.
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leaves us to rely only on verbal reports, the problem is that these verbal
reports can already very easily be designed to endorse false facts.
Such an environment could leave us not with a free market of ideas,
but rather, as noted in the introduction, in a kind of Hobbesian
informational “war of all against all”192 where any and every source of
factual information might be a fake. This brings us at least a little bit
closer to the kind of nightmarish dystopia described in this Essay’s
introduction: the kind common in the genre of paranoid science fiction,
where all of our perceptual experience might be a delusion.193
To be sure, a world of forged photos, videos, and newspapers is not
quite as unsettling as a world where human beings are themselves fake, or
where the objects they see can and see and touch are illusions. But the
informational anarchy and paranoia that could characterize such a world
might at least present a serious (and possibly insuperable challenge) to
those elements of individual decision making or collective self-rule that
require us to trust some sources of external information.194
Consequently, scholars and jurists should at least explore adding the
following addendum to the framework from United States v. Alvarez:
where false statements do not merely state false facts, but are also given
in a form that carries with it indicia for reliability (such as a falsified
newspaper or video or audio tape), the government should have greater
power to regulate than it typically has to regulate false words. It should
not, under this approach, always have to demonstrate that additional harm
flows from the forgery of a video or faked news story from a major
192. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (Clarendon Press 1909) (1651).
193. 2 GARY WESTPHAL, THE GREENWOOD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SCIENCE FICTION AND
FANTASY 585 (2005).
194. There are, of course, conspiracy theorists in the United States who already believe
that much of what is reported in the mainstream media consists of the kind of stage-managed
falsity I have described above and that the stage manager is the government. They already
believe that many of their fellow citizens are being manipulated and that many experts
cannot be trusted. This belief has provided a willing audience for claims that events such as
the San Bernardino and Las Vegas shootings and school shooting in Parkland, Florida, are
government operations designed to manipulate audiences. While it is not the purpose of this
Essay to discuss or analyze their views in depth, one thing that may make them more open to
placing credence in tweets, Facebook posts, or comments in YouTube videos by individuals
with such views is that they have already rejected the sources of knowledge—mainstream
journalism or video and audio records—of events that, for others, continue to provide a
reliable source of knowledge about the world, and continue to provide the basis for a
consensus about much of the factual content that lies beyond each individual’s direct
experience.
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publication. The trick such an alteration plays on our senses and our
ability to serve as watchmen should, in some cases, by itself be enough to
act against the forgery.
This is already how the First Amendment applies where individuals
imitate government officials—for example, in impersonating a police
officer. Justice Kennedy acknowledged in Alvarez that laws may
“prohibit impersonating a Government officer” and punish someone who
engages in such impersonation even without a showing of “‘actual
financial or property loss’ resulting from the deception.”195 He argues that
the First Amendment can allow such punishment of falsity in the absence
of a showing of financial or other concrete harm because such
impersonation threatens another kind of harm: undermining the dignity
and good repute of government. But fabrication of video- or audiorecordings and of other social practices that allow us to identify reliable
records of outside events can likewise do harm even where it does not
cause financial or physical harm. It can undermine our ability to generate,
and then draw upon, reliable sources of knowledge of the world beyond
our direct perceptions.
This approach is necessarily tentative and comes with three major
caveats. First, if it is to be an addendum to the Alvarez consensus among
the Justices rather than a rejection of it, it cannot empower government to
restrict the content of our communications in public discourse. Consistent
with that consensus, individuals should still be able make whatever
claims—even false ones—they wish to make about matters of public
concern so long as they avoid doing so in ways that defame, defraud, or
otherwise cause legally cognizable harm to others. What they should not
have free rein to do under the cover of the First Amendment, under the
approach considered here, is disguise the source of their claims in
authoritative clothing by using technology such as video- or audiofabrication or digital forgery to give it an appearance of reality that the
expressive content alone cannot create. In other words, while the First
Amendment gives someone the right in a discussion of public affairs to
provide any answer they like—even a false one—to the question, “What
should I believe?” and even to the follow-up question, “Why should I
believe that?,” it doesn’t give them the right to answer the latter question
by creating an illusion rather than an explanation.

195. United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 721 (2012).
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This means that courts must somehow be able to mark a line between
the expressive content itself and the features of that content’s medium or
source—and to assure that the expressive content remains free from
government censorship in the absence of legally cognizable harm. But
drawing such a line may be quite challenging. The analysis above has
been built in part on the intuition that there is an important distinction in
the way we perceive different kinds of evidence about events in the
external world and, more specifically, that we tend to view video or audio
footage as a form of indirectly perceiving an event for ourselves. What
we see or hear in a recording is often treated by people not as a form of
evidence that may be subject to distortion or manipulation, but as a
window into reality. By contrast, we are more likely to view verbal
reports as possibly mistaken or dishonest. But one might object to giving
this intuitive difference constitutional significance. After all, in response
to the question “why should I believe” a certain proposition, one might
answer with verbal explanation rather than pointing to a purported video
or audio recording. If, for instance, someone is asked to prove that a riot
occurred in a certain city, he might respond not by showing video or
audio of the riot, but rather by answering that he was there and providing
a description of the experience that seems rich in detail. The proposal I
am making here—that courts might bar individuals from creating their
own indicia of reliability (by, for example, creating video evidence)—
requires accepting First Amendment doctrine that allows restriction of
one method of making the case for a belief (through altered video) but not
another (by a verbal performance intended to give the false impression
that certain memories and experiences actually occurred).
Drawing a line between source or medium and content is likely to be
even more difficult where one turns from recording to other indicia of
reliability. How, for example, should the First Amendment treat a fake,
web-based newspaper that adopts the look and feel of a real newspaper
but does so without using any real newspaper’s trademark or trade dress?
On the one hand, a website’s or print publication’s use of certain designs
or names can effectively manipulate readers into assuming that the
information is from a professional news organization that follows
journalistic techniques for gathering and verifying information. On the
other hand, the fake newspaper’s design choices intuitively seem to be as
much a part of that newspaper’s expressive content as are the words or
artistry on a book cover. Moreover, real journalists could conceivably
find other, more foolproof ways of authenticating themselves to readers—
for example, with professional certification standards. And this
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authentication method, then, may be something that the government
might prevent someone from forging.
Helen Norton has already analyzed a very similar challenge, exploring
how the government can protect citizens from the confusion they might
face “when private speakers seek the government’s perceived imprimatur
to manipulate onlookers’ common—indeed, sometimes automatic—
reliance on an idea’s source as the measure of its value.”196 Her focus is
on taking such concern into account and looking at a speech’s “source
cues” to determine whether speech is private or government speech for
purposes of the First Amendment.197 But it also stresses the importance—
to listeners and viewers—of being able to accurately identify speech that
legitimately comes from government.198
My major point in this subsection is a related one: our experience of
the world—and our capacity to make confident judgments about it—
requires that we have some sources of evidence that, as Norton puts it,
allow us to place “common” and perhaps “automatic” “reliance on an
idea’s source as the measure of its value.”199 Moreover, where we do treat
evidence that way, then First Amendment ground rules cannot insist that
we be our own “watchmen for truth,” with all the uncertainty that entails:
courts cannot demand that each of us show the kind of skeptical attitude
and hesitation to accept a claim that is the hallmark of being a watchman
with regard to evidence that we must be able to accept automatically and
without anxiety about its truth. Courts already generally read the First
Amendment as allowing government to help safeguard individuals’
reliance in certain contexts such as commercial or professional
interactions. It may have some room to do so even outside of those social
spheres where individuals need to take certain evidence on faith.
A second caveat is that even if courts can meet the difficult challenge
of drawing a line between falsification of a speech source or medium and
false speech content, they could not simply assume that the First
Amendment offers no protection on the non-content side of this line. The
video-altering technology that allows individuals to undermine each
other’s grasp of what is real will likely have other, more benevolent uses.
It might, for example, provide moviemakers with yet another tool to
196. Helen Norton, The Measure of Government Speech: Identifying the Expression’s
Source, 88 B.U. L. REV. 587, 597 (2008).
197. Id at 597–618.
198. Id. at 615.
199. Id.
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create the special effects that can make narrative films feel real to an
audience. Thus, the same technology that might lose First Amendment
protection when it fabricates news might merit robust First Amendment
protection when it is, like other tools of modern filmmaking, a means of
telling a story. We thus appear to face, in addressing this technology,
some of the same concerns that have pushed scholars like David Strauss
to define the category of unprotected false statements “very narrowly.”200
Giving the government too much power to control how we use imagealtering technology risks empowering it not only to prevent thorough
deception, but also to restrict how we tell stories or otherwise express
ourselves with technology.
A third caveat is that the proposal considered here is far from a
complete antidote for all of the dangers that flow from what Eugene
Volokh calls “cheap speech.”201 In a 1995 article outlining the effects that
the then-nascent internet might have on First Amendment activity,
Volokh noted that while the internet would democratize speech and have
other positive effects, “when speakers can communicate to the public
directly, it’s possible their speech will be less trustworthy: they might not
be willing to hire fact checkers, or might not be influenced enough by
professional journalistic norms, or might not care enough about their
long-term reputation for accuracy.”202 More recently, Tim Wu has linked
the rise of cheap speech to the listeners’ ability to sort quality speech
from falsehoods, thus also giving rise to forms of private censorship by
speakers themselves. Wu emphasizes that whereas “it was once hard to
speak, it is now hard to be heard,” because the flood of information
available on the internet makes it hard to capture listeners’ attention.203
Richard Hasen similarly argues that the internet-driven shift to cheap
speech has caused a “collapse of traditional media” and “a rise in false
news stories (‘fake news’) spread via social media.”204 Even if
government can preserve the indicia of reliability of certain speech, that is
no guarantee that listeners will notice the speech or do what they have to
200. Strauss, supra note 132, at 366.
201. Eugene Volokh, Cheap Speech and What It Will Do, 104 YALE L.J. 1805, 1807
(1995).
202. Id. at 1838.
203. Tim Wu, Is the First Amendment Obsolete? 7 (Columbia Pub. Law Research, Paper
No. 14-573, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3096337.
204. Richard L. Hasen, Cheap Speech and What It Has Done (to American Democracy),
18 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 200, 204–05 (2018).
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do to locate it. Nor can any law assure that they will continue to use such
indicia of reliability. Even if the First Amendment gives government
leeway to stop individuals from exploiting and ultimately undermining
the trust individuals place in certain media or sources of speech, it cannot
force individuals to place more trust in professional journalists than in the
wild speculations of conspiracy theorists.
V. Conclusion
The proposal I have just explored is that, by giving government more
leeway to protect the marks of reliability in certain speech, the First
Amendment can allow government to aid in preserving the value of social
practices, like the practice of journalism or of scientific disciplines, that
are themselves independent of government. What the government should
be allowed by the First Amendment to do on this approach, in other
words, is not take a leading role in sorting truth from falsehood. That is
precisely what Supreme Court has said the Constitution cannot trust
government to do. Rather, instead of replacing such social practices with
its own truth-sorting mechanism, government’s role should be to preserve
those social practices and technological possibilities that have already
evolved and function free of government direction or interference. As I
described above, such sorting is already done, though less dangerously,
by certain social practices that individuals inevitably rely upon to form
reliable knowledge about the world that lies beyond their direct
perception—that is, it is already done by a knowledge ecosystem. If, even
with the help of government defense against attacks of the sort made by
digital impostors and forgery artists, this constellation of social practices
and technology still finds itself collapsing, the solution will lie not in First
Amendment law (or constitutional law of any sort), but in other measures
that might entail the emergence of new social practices and technologies.
At a high level of generality, what the First Amendment may have to
allow room for is similar to the role played by the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act (DMCA) in the realm of copyright law.205 Congress did
not invent the copyright protection technologies that various rightsholders have generated to protect movies, for example, against the
enhanced threat the computers have created to copyright (given the ease
with which one can copy and disseminate a digital movie). What it did
205. See Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, sec. 103, § 1201, 112
Stat. 2860, 2863 (1998).
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instead is let private parties create such technology themselves, and then
legally shield the technology from those who would circumvent it. 206
Although commentators have understandably objected to the high, often
insuperable, barriers placed by the DMCA in the way of individuals who
wish to make legal and “fair use” of movies or music,207 the general
template is a common one and one that might have application in First
Amendment law: when law establishes and protect rights, it does so in
conjunction with other practices that make such rights possible, such as
social norms or physical constraints. In fact, legal protection of rights is
often most effective when it adds its protection to freedom-supporting
features of the natural or social world or to technologies invented by
private parties. Here, too, this may be a model that post-Alvarez First
Amendment doctrine on false statements should allow room for.
Conceding that it is not for law alone to save people from being deceived
by fake news, judges might at least interpret the First Amendment to let
government support the social practices and practical realities that do so
(or may evolve to do so in the future).
On the other hand, such a project also carries with it the same kinds of
risks that have led the Court to hesitate before excluding false statements
from the First Amendment’s scope. Just as allowing government to
censor damaging lies might simultaneously empower it to exercise a more
far-reaching power over public discourse, allowing it to restrict the way
individuals use video-altering or other source-imitating technology may
give it more power than it should have to control the way individuals
express themselves (artistically or otherwise) with emerging technologies.
The question raised by deep fakes and similar technology, then, is
whether First Amendment law can leave government with room to
protect the social foundations that allow individuals to serve as their own
“watchmen for truth” without simultaneously inviting officials to control
and restrict how they play that role.

206. See Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113
HARV. L. REV. 501, 519 (1999).
207. Id.
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